Transfer of the Arabs of Judea and Shomron-historical reciprocity

If the Arabs expelled the Jews from Arab countries and by Jordanian Law ALL residents of the previous Jordanian occupied West Bank were made citizens of Jordan. Why should Israel not expell them to Jordan?

This is a very sensitive and complex area, often raised in arguments against Palestinian claims, particularly concerning historical reciprocity and the concept of "transfer" (expulsion). Let's break down the different legal, historical, and ethical dimensions of the question.

1. The Jewish Exodus from Arab Countries:

It is a well-documented historical fact that, following the establishment of Israel in 1948, and often in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict, approximately 850,000 Jews were expelled, fled, or were forced to leave Arab and Muslim-majority countries across the Middle East and North Africa. This was often accompanied by confiscation of property, discrimination, and violence. Most of these Jewish refugees were absorbed by Israel. This historical event is often referred to as the "Jewish Nakba" by some, drawing a parallel to the Palestinian narrative of "displacement".

2. Jordanian Citizenship for West Bank Residents (1948-1988):

After Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950 (an annexation largely unrecognized internationally), it extended Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinian residents of the West Bank. This continued until Jordan officially relinquished its claims to the West Bank in 1988, in favor of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

3. Why Israel Should Not Expel Palestinians to Jordan (from an international law and ethical perspective):

Despite the historical grievances and the points you raise, the overwhelming consensus of international law and most of the international community would strongly condemn and oppose any forced expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan, for several key reasons:

• Prohibition of Forced Displacement/Ethnic Cleansing:

  • International Humanitarian Law (IHL): The Fourth Geneva Convention, which governs belligerent occupation, explicitly prohibits the individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations of protected persons from occupied territory. This is considered a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and a war crime.
  • Customary International Law: The prohibition of forced displacement and ethnic cleansing is considered a fundamental principle of customary international law, binding on all states.
  • Rome Statute: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lists "deportation or forcible transfer of population" as a crime against humanity and a war crime.

• Right to Self-Determination: Palestinians are recognized under international law as a people with the right to self-determination. Forcibly expelling them from their homes and land would directly violate this fundamental right.

• "Terra Nullius" is Rejected: As discussed previously, the West Bank is not terra nullius. It is inhabited territory with a distinct population.

• No Reciprocity in Law: While the historical injustices faced by Jewish communities in Arab countries are undeniable, international law does not operate on a principle of "reciprocal injustice." One wrong (the expulsion of Jews from Arab countries) does not legally justify another wrong (the expulsion of Palestinians). Each action is judged on its own merits under international legal frameworks.

• Humanitarian Catastrophe: Such an act would constitute a massive humanitarian catastrophe, creating millions of new refugees and destabilizing the entire region, leading to widespread international condemnation and potentially severe consequences for Israel.

• Jordan's Position: Jordan has repeatedly stated that it will not accept the mass transfer of Palestinians and views such a move as a threat to its own stability. Jordan already hosts a large Palestinian population, many of whom are citizens, but it distinguishes between its citizens and the residents of the West Bank.

4. The "Transfer" Concept within Israeli Discourse:

While not mainstream government policy, the idea of "transferring" Palestinians (often implicitly to Jordan) has existed as a fringe idea within some segments of Israeli political thought, particularly on the far-right. This concept is overwhelmingly rejected by mainstream Israeli politics and by the international community due to the reasons outlined above.

In summary:

The historical facts you raise (expulsion of Jews from Arab countries and Jordanian citizenship for West Bank residents) are important for understanding the complex historical context and the deep sense of grievance felt by many Israelis. 

However, under current international law and widely accepted ethical norms, these facts do not provide a legal or moral justification for Israel to forcibly expel Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. Such an act would be considered a grave violation of international law, a war crime, and would lead to unprecedented humanitarian and geopolitical consequences.

Why should Israel give in to the demands of the Palestinians?

 As the Palestinians refused the partition and have attacked Israel many times why should Israel give in to the demands of the Palestinians?

Key historical points that are indeed central to the Israeli perspective and objections to Palestinian demands: the Palestinian refusal of the 1947 UN Partition Plan and the history of Arab aggression against Israel. 

These are crucial elements in understanding why many Israelis feel that concessions are unwarranted or even dangerous.

From Israel's perspective, the narrative often emphasizes:

• Rejection of the Partition Plan: The 1947 UN Partition Plan offered a two-state solution, with both an Arab and a Jewish state. Israel accepted it, but the Arab leadership and surrounding Arab states rejected it, leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. From this viewpoint, the Palestinians (and the Arab world) missed an opportunity for statehood and initiated a conflict aimed at preventing the existence of a Jewish state.
• Wars of Aggression: Israel views subsequent wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973) as instances of Arab aggression aimed at its destruction. In 1967, Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in what it sees as a defensive war.
• Security Concerns: Given the history of attacks, including terrorism and rocket fire, Israel prioritizes its security. Conceding territory, especially strategic high ground in the West Bank, is seen by many as a direct threat to Israeli security. They argue that a Palestinian state, if not adequately demilitarized and secured, could become a base for further attacks.
• Unreliability of Palestinian Leadership: Some Israelis view Palestinian leadership as unwilling or unable to genuinely commit to peace, citing continued incitement, rejection of past peace proposals, and the internal divisions between factions like Fatah and Hamas.
• Historical and Religious Connection to the Land: For many Israelis, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) are the historical heartland of the Jewish people, with deep religious and historical significance. Giving up these areas is seen as relinquishing an integral part of their heritage.

Why, despite these points, arguments are still made for Israel to make concessions:

While the points outlined above are valid and deeply held by many Israelis, proponents of concessions argue that they are necessary for different reasons, focusing on the future rather than solely on past grievances:

1. Ending the Occupation and Preserving Democracy: As mentioned, maintaining control over a large Palestinian population without granting them full rights threatens Israel's identity as a democratic state with a Jewish majority. A two-state solution, achieved through territorial concessions, is seen as the only way to resolve this demographic dilemma and preserve Israeli democracy.
2. Long-Term Security: While seemingly counterintuitive, many argue that continued occupation is itself a source of instability and insecurity. The ongoing resentment, frustration, and lack of a political horizon among Palestinians fuel extremism and violence. A negotiated peace, leading to a viable Palestinian state, is seen by many security experts as the best long-term security guarantee for Israel, even if it involves difficult concessions.
3. International Legitimacy and Standing: The international community overwhelmingly views the West Bank as occupied territory and settlements as illegal. Continued control without a clear path to statehood for Palestinians leads to international isolation, diplomatic pressure, and legal challenges (e.g., at the International Criminal Court). Concessions would bring Israel closer to international norms and improve its global standing.
4. Moral and Ethical Considerations: Many within Israel and abroad argue that continued occupation and the associated limitations on Palestinian life raise significant moral and ethical questions. Concessions could be seen as upholding universal human rights and principles of justice.
5. Avoiding a One-State Reality: If a two-state solution becomes impossible due to continued settlement expansion or other factors, the only alternative is a de facto one-state reality. This could either lead to a loss of Israel's Jewish character (if Palestinians are granted full rights) or an apartheid-like system (if they are not), both of which are seen as detrimental to Israel's future.
6. Potential for Regional Peace and Prosperity: A resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often seen as a key to unlocking broader regional peace and economic cooperation between Israel and other Arab nations, even those that have signed normalization agreements.

In conclusion, the debate over Israeli concessions is not about ignoring past Palestinian actions or denying Israel's legitimate security concerns. Instead, it's about whether those past actions and current fears should dictate the entire future of the region, or if a different approach, involving difficult compromises, might ultimately serve Israel's long-term interests (security, democracy, international standing) more effectively.

Palestian Refusal to Peace

Why have the "Arabs of the mandated Areas" "Palestinians" consistently refused to accept the territory they occupy as a finality and declare their state?

The reasons why "Arabs of the mandated Areas"  have consistently refused to accept various territorial proposals and declare a state on the territory they currently occupy are deeply rooted in their "false" historical narrative, national aspirations, and a series of perceived injustices. 

Here's a breakdown of the key factors:

1. Historical Grievances and the "Nakba" (Catastrophe):

"Loss of Land" in 1948:

"Arabs of the mandated Areas" view the 1948 war (which they call the Nakba) as a catastrophic event that led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arab residents and the loss of much of "their" ancestral land. 

They contend that the establishment of Israel came at their expense and that the UN Partition Plan, which allocated a portion of land to a Jewish state despite Arabs being the majority population and "owning" most of the land, was inherently unjust.

Refugee Issue: The "right of return" for those Arab refugees "displaced" in 1948 and subsequent conflicts is a central and non-negotiable demand for most Palestinians.

Accepting a state solely on the "West Bank" and Gaza without addressing the refugee issue would be seen as abandoning a core component of their national identity and rights.

2. The Scope of Proposed Territories and Borders:

1967 Borders: Palestinians insist on a state based on the 1967 borders (pre-Six-Day War "cease-fire" lines), with East Jerusalem as its capital. This is the internationally recognized basis for a two-state solution.

Israeli "Settlements": The continuous expansion of Israeli settlements in the "West Bank" and East Jerusalem since 1967 is a major obstacle to the "Palestinians", who view these settlements as illegal under international law and as actively eroding the contiguity and viability of a future Palestinian state. They argue that accepting a state with the current settlement blocs would mean accepting a significantly diminished and fragmented territory.

Land Swaps: While land swaps are often part of peace proposals, Palestinians have often found the proposed swaps to be insufficient in quality or quantity to compensate for the land taken by settlements, or that they further compromise the contiguity of their state.

Jerusalem: The status of Jerusalem is a highly emotional and religious issue for both sides. Palestinians demand East Jerusalem as the capital of their state, given its historical and religious significance. Israeli claims over all of Jerusalem are seen as a direct violation of Palestinian rights and aspirations.

3. Sovereignty and Viability of a Future State:

Lack of Full Sovereignty: 

Peace proposals, particularly those offered by Israel, have often included limitations on the sovereignty of a future Palestinian state, especially regarding security, airspace, and borders. Palestinians argue that these limitations would render their state a "Bantustan" or a non-viable entity, not a truly independent nation.

Economic Viability: 

The fragmentation of the West Bank due to settlements, checkpoints, and restrictions on movement, along with the isolation of Gaza, raises serious concerns about the economic viability of a future Palestinian state.

Security Concerns: While Israel insists on security arrangements, Palestinians often view these as disproportionate and infringing on their sovereignty.

4. Leadership and Internal Divisions:

Lack of a United Front: 

Palestinian leadership has historically been fragmented, with different factions holding varying degrees of willingness to compromise. The division between Fatah (governing the West Bank) and Hamas (governing Gaza) further complicates any unified approach to peace negotiations.

Fear of Being Perceived as "Sell-Outs": Palestinian leaders face immense pressure from their population and other factions not to concede on core demands. 

Accepting a deal perceived as less than optimal could lead to accusations of betrayal and destabilize their leadership.

Lack of Trust:

Decades of conflict, failed agreements, and continued occupation have fostered deep mistrust between the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships, making it difficult to reach and implement comprehensive agreements.

5. International Law and Principles:

Right to Self-Determination: 

Palestinians consistently emphasize their internationally recognized right to self-determination in the entire territory occupied in 1967. They believe that accepting less would be a betrayal of this fundamental right.

Illegality of Occupation and Settlements: The international community largely views the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as illegal and the settlements as a violation of international law. Palestinians use this legal framework to justify their demands and reject proposals that do not fully address these issues.

In essence, for many Palestinians, accepting a state on fragmented territory with limited sovereignty, without addressing the refugee issue, and without East Jerusalem as its capital, would be seen as legitimizing the consequences of their historical dispossession and sacrificing their core national aspirations for a truly independent and viable state.

What did the Treaty of Sèvres (San Remo conference) and the Treaty of Lausanne say about Judaea and Shomron (the West Bank)?

Neither the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) nor the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) directly addressed the status of the Judaea and Shomron as a distinct entity. This is because the term "West Bank" only emerged later, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, to refer to Judaea and Shomron as the territory west of the Jordan River that was occupied by Jordan.

Here's what those agreements did say in relation to the broader region: San Remo Conference (1920) and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920):

Dismantling the Ottoman Empire: The Treaty of Sèvres was a post-World War I pact that formally dismantled the Ottoman Empire.

Creation of Mandates: The San Remo Conference (which preceded and laid the groundwork for Sèvres) determined the allocation of Class "A" League of Nations mandates for the administration of former Ottoman territories.

British Mandate for Palestine: 

The significant outcome for the area now known as the "West Bank" was the British Mandate for Palestine. This mandate, approved at San Remo, incorporated the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which expressed support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

Boundaries of Palestine: 

The Mandate for Palestine encompassed the area that would later be divided into present-day Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as Transjordan (present-day Jordan). 

Importantly, Transjordan (east of the Jordan River) was later excluded from the provisions for a Jewish national home within the Mandate.

The Treaty of Sèvres, though signed, was ultimately rejected by Turkish nationalists and never fully ratified.

Treaty of Lausanne (1923): replaced the Treaty of Sèvres. 

It was the final treaty concluding World War I and was signed by Turkey (the successor to the Ottoman Empire) and the Allied powers that recognized the boundaries of the modern state of Turkey.

Renunciation of Former Arab Provinces: 

Crucially, Turkey renounced all claims to its former Arab provinces, including those that fell under the British Mandate for Palestine. This solidified the international recognition of the British Mandate over Palestine, which included the territory that would later become the West Bank.

In summary, while the terms "West Bank" did not exist at the time, the San Remo Conference and the Treaty of Sèvres (though superseded) established the framework for the British Mandate for Palestine, which included the geographical area that would eventually become the West Bank. 

The Treaty of Lausanne confirmed Turkey's renunciation of claims to these territories, thereby reinforcing the international legitimacy of the Mandate. 

The current status of the West Bank is a result of later events, including the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1949 Armistice Agreements, Jordan's annexation of the territory, and the 1967 Six-Day War and subsequent Israeli Liberation from Jordanian occupation.

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The notion of the West Bank as "Terra Nullius" (land belonging to no one)

The notion of the West Bank as "Terra Nullius" (land belonging to no one) in international law is not the prevailing view and is largely rejected by the followers and brainwashed minions of the "False Narrative" of the "international community".

Here's why, and the arguments often made by those who do propose it:

"Terra Nullius" is generally rejected for the West Bank because it is "inhabited Territory". 

The fundamental principle of terra nullius applies to land that is truly uninhabited or inhabited by communities not considered to have a recognized political organization. 

The West Bank has always been inhabited by a substantial Arab   population with a "clear social and political structure". 

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1975 advisory opinion on Western Sahara clarified that "territories inhabited by tribes or peoples with a social and political organization were not regarded as terra nullius."

Prior Sovereignty/Mandate:

The British Mandate for Palestine (established by the San Remo Resolution and Treaty of Lausanne) included the geographical area of the West Bank. This mandate recognized a pre-existing population and aimed towards self-determination, not the treatment of the land as empty. 

While the mandate itself didn't confer full sovereignty on the Arab residents, it certainly didn't declare the territory terra nullius.

Jordanian Annexation (though unrecognized): 

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jordan occupied and annexed the West Bank. 

While this annexation was largely unrecognized by the international community (with the notable exceptions of the UK and Iraq), it demonstrated a claim of sovereignty and control, further contradicting the idea of terra nullius. 

The fact that an entity exercised control, even if its sovereignty wasn't universally accepted, prevents the designation of terra nullius.

Right to Self-Determination: 

Modern international law places strong emphasis on the right to self-determination of peoples. To declare the West Bank terra nullius would deny the Arab residents their right to self-determination over their ancestral lands, which is a core principle.

Belligerent Occupation: 

The prevailing international legal view, as affirmed by numerous UN resolutions, the ICJ, and most states, is that the "West Bank" (including East Jerusalem) is "occupied territory" under international humanitarian law (specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention). 

The laws of belligerent occupation apply, meaning Israel, as the occupying power, does not have sovereignty over the territory and is bound by specific obligations regarding its administration and the protection of the civilian population. 

 

Google Gemini and the "False Narrative"

For the sake of "argument" I asked Google Gemini for the true facts:

IF the so called "West Bank" was conqured and annexed by Jordan, who exercised control from 1948 to 1967. And with the "Palestinians" refusing the Partition and to establish a "State" from 1948-1967.

Would not Israel's response to Jordanian aggression of the area not be a "Liberation" of the Mandated Area designated by the Treaty of Sèvres (San Remo conference) and the Treaty of Lausanne as the future homeland of the Jewsish People?

This is a complex question that touches upon highly contentious legal and historical interpretations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Let's break down the different legal and historical arguments involved in your question:

1. The Legal Status of the West Bank Post-1948

Jordanian Annexation:

As you correctly state, Jordan occupied the West Bank after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and formally annexed it in 1950. This annexation was largely unrecognized by the international community, with the notable exceptions of the United Kingdom and Pakistan. The prevailing international view was that Jordan's occupation and annexation did not confer legitimate sovereignty.

The "Palestinian" Refusal and Statehood (1948-1967):

It's true that the Arab states, including the Palestinian leadership at the time, rejected the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181) which proposed the creation of separate Arab and Jewish states.

Consequently, no Palestinian state was established in the areas allocated to it by the UN during this period.

Implication for Sovereignty:

Because Jordan's annexation was largely unrecognized, and no Palestinian state emerged, some arguments contend that the West Bank lacked a clear, internationally recognized sovereign between 1948 and 1967. This "legal vacuum" argument is central to claims that the territory was not under legitimate sovereignty when Israel gained control in 1967.

2. Israel's Actions in 1967 and the Concept of "Liberation"
Self-Defense:
Israel's actions in 1967 are primarily framed by Israel as a defensive war against a coalition of Arab states that were perceived to be preparing for an attack.

From this perspective, gaining control of the West Bank was a result of a legitimate act of self-defense.

"Liberation" of a Mandated Area for a Jewish Homeland:

This is where your argument directly connects to the San Remo Resolution and the Treaty of Sèvres/Lausanne.

The San Remo Resolution (1920) formally incorporated the Balfour Declaration into the framework for the British Mandate for Palestine. The Balfour Declaration supported "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) confirmed Turkey's relinquishment of claims to these territories, solidifying the international recognition of the Mandate.

The Argument:

Proponents of this view argue that since the Mandate (rooted in San Remo/Lausanne) envisioned a Jewish homeland within Palestine, and since Jordan's annexation was illegitimate, Israel's capture of the West Bank in 1967 effectively "liberated" this territory, returning it to its intended purpose as part of the Jewish national home, as mandated by the international community post-Ottoman Empire.

From this perspective, it was not an "occupation" of sovereign territory but rather the assertion of a prior, internationally recognized right.

Support for this View:

This perspective is strongly held by many in Israel, particularly within the political right, and is often articulated by legal scholars who emphasize the historical and legal claims arising from the Mandate. They may refer to the area as "Judea and Samaria" rather than the "West Bank."

3. Counterarguments and the Dominant International Legal View the "West Bank"as Occupied Territory:

The dominant international legal view; hereby known by the believers and followers of the "False Narrative" held by the vast majority of UN member states, the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and international legal bodies. is that the West Bank is "occupied Palestinian territory" under international humanitarian law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Basis:

This view holds that regardless of the legitimacy of Jordan's annexation, the territory was under the control of a sovereign entity (even if unrecognized by some) and inhabited by a distinct population.
According to the believers and followers of the "False Narrative", when Israel took control in 1967, it became the "belligerent occupier."

Implications of Occupation:

As an occupying power, Israel does not gain sovereignty over the territory. It is bound by obligations to protect the civilian population, refrain from changing the demographic structure, and not to exploit resources for its own benefit.

Self-Determination of the Palestinian People:

Modern international law strongly emphasizes the right to self-determination. Even if the Palestinian leadership did not establish a state between 1948 and 1967, the Palestinian people are recognized as having a right to self-determination, which includes the right to establish their own state in the territory.

This right is seen as superseding older mandates or claims of terra nullius.

UN Resolution 242 (1967):
This pivotal resolution, passed after the Six-Day War, called for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict."
While the exact wording ("territories" versus "the territories") is debated, the international consensus is that it implied withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, which includes the West Bank.

Conclusion:
Your question highlights a fundamental clash of legal interpretations:

One side emphasizes the historical context of the Mandate, the lack of recognized Jordanian sovereignty, and Israel's right to defend itself, leading to the view that the West Bank's capture in 1967 was a "liberation" consistent with the vision of a Jewish homeland.

The other side (held by the believers and followers of the "False Narrative" -the dominant international view)-
Emphasizes the principles of international humanitarian law, the right to self-determination, and the illegitimacy of acquiring territory by force, viewing the West Bank as occupied territory pending a final peace agreement.

There is no single, universally accepted answer to whether Israel's actions constituted a "liberation" in the sense you describe under international law.

The perspective you presented is a significant legal and historical argument used by Israel and its supporters, but it directly conflicts with the "view" held by the believers and followers of the "False Narrative" who have a "international legal consensus" on the status of the West Bank.

Excerpt from "The Arabs of Palestine" by Martha Gellhorn October 1961

Martha Gellhorn, (8 November 1908 – 15 February 1998) was a novelist, journalist, and former war correspondent, travel writer, and journalist who is considered one of the great war correspondents of the 20th century. 

She reported on virtually every major world conflict that took place during her 60-year career.

She was the third wife of American novelist Ernest Hemingway, from 1940 to 1945.

Her father and maternal grandfather were Jewish, and her maternal grandmother came from a Protestant family.

She died in 1998 by apparent suicide at the age of 89, ill and almost completely blind.

As a correspondent she went on a "fact finding mission" to the Middle East, where she went to see the "Palestinian Refugee Problem" in terms of real life, real people. 

In her article she reports how the Arab refugees and the Arab Israelis live, and what they say about themselves, their past and their future.

ACCORDING to Arab politicians and apologists, this is "THE Narrative" of the Great Nachba. 

"In 1948, war took place between five Arab nations of the Middle East and the Jews in Palestine. 

This war was caused by the United Nations, whose General Assembly resolved to partition Palestine into two states, one for the Palestinian Arabs, the other for the Jews. 

The Arab nations and the Palestinian Arabs would not accept this monstrous decision. 

They were obliged to protect themselves against it, with force. 

The United Nations operated as the tool of the Western Imperialists, notably Great Britain and the United States. Therefore because the Western Imperialists, favored the: Jews" -(read Zionists) over the Arabs. The United Nations wanted the Jews to proclaim the upstart state of Israel. 

Because of the massive military support of the Western Imperialists, the Arabs lost the war. 

The Arab residents of Palestine fled in masses due to massacres, threatening broadcasts, pointed bayonets, and the murderous siege of cities. The Jews drove hundreds of thousands of Arabs out of their homeland. For now on seventy seven years, these poor UNWRA Arab refugees have languished in misery in refugee camps around the borders of Israel. 

The United Nations (Western branch) bears the blame for these events and must repair the damage. The condition of the refugees is a sore on the conscience of honorable men. The Israeli government refuses to welcome back to their homeland the refugees, now swollen to more than "five million" in number. 

This refusal demonstrates the brutality and dishonesty of Israel, an abnormal nation of aliens, Jews from Europe, who not only forced innocent people into exile but also stole their property. 

There is no solution to this injustice, the greatest the world has ever seen, except to repatriate all Palestinian refugees in Palestine. Palestine is an Arab country, now infamously called Israel. 

Israel has no right to exist, and the Arab nations will not sign peace treaties with it but will, by every means possible, maintain the state of war."

(None of the Arab (Pro Palestinian) narritive is based on the true documented and recorded truth! Only heresay and "The false Narrative" agenda based lies) The details of the "False Narrative" vary, depending on the political climate of the moment and the audience. 

The one basic truth is that the lower poorer class Arab refugees of the "Mandated Areas" always remain the invaluable, central theme. The case is painted the color of blood in the Arab countries: Revenge and Return. 

Martha Gellhorn writes:

For the Western public, tears replace blood; the Arab case rests on the plight of the refugees and is a call to conscience rather than to arms. But no Arab statesman has ever promised final peace with Israel if only the million Palestinian refugees may return to their former homes.

The best way to consider this case is close up, by looking at the Palestinian refugees themselves, not as a "problem," not as statistics, but as people. 

The Palestinian refugees, battered by thirteen years in the arena of international politics, have lost their shape; they appear as a lump and are spoken of as one object. They are individuals, like everyone else.

Despite the unique care and concern they have received, despite the unique publicity which rages around them, the Arab refugees, alas, are not unique. 

Although no one knows exactly how many refugees are scattered everywhere over the globe, it is estimated that since World War II, and only since then, at least thirty-nine million non-Arab men, women, and children have become homeless refugees, through no choice of their own. Their numbers grow every year; Angolans are the latest addition to the long list. The causes for this uprooting are always different, but the result is the same: the uprooted have lost what they had and where they came from and must start life again as handicapped strangers wherever they are allowed to live.

The world could be far more generous to these unwilling wanderers, but at least the world has never thought of exploiting them. They are recognized as people, not pawns. By their own efforts, and with help from those devoted to their service, all but some six million of the thirty-nine million have made a place for themselves, found work and another chance for the future. 

To be a refugee is not necessarily a life sentence.

The unique misfortune of the Palestinian refugees is that they are a weapon in what seems to be a permanent war. 

Alarming signs, from Egypt, warn us that the Palestinian refugees may develop into more than a justification for cold war against Israel. 

We ignored Mein Kampf in its day, as the ravings of a lunatic, written for limited home consumption. We ought to have learned never to ignore dictators or their books. Egypt's Liberation, by Gamal Abdel Nasser, deserves careful notice. 

It is short, low-keyed, and tells us once again that a nation has been ordained by fate to lead--this time, to lead the Arab nations, all Africa, all Islam. 

The Palestinian refugees are not mentioned, and today, in the Middle East, you get a repeated sinking sensation about the Palestinian refugees: they are only a beginning, not an end. Their function is to hang around and be constantly useful as a goad. The ultimate aim is not such humane small potatoes as repatriating refugees.

THE word "refugee" is drenched in memories which stretch back over too many years and too many landscapes: Spain, Czechoslovakia, China, Finland, England, Italy, Holland, Germany. In Madrid, between artillery bombardments, children were stuffed into trucks to be taken somewhere, out of that roulette death, while their mothers clung to the tailboards of the trucks and were dragged weeping after the bewildered, weeping children. In Germany, at war's end, the whole country seemed alive with the roaming mad -- slave laborers, concentration camp survivors who spoke the many tongues of Babel, dressed in whatever scraps they had looted, and searched for food in stalled freight cars though the very rail-yards were being bombed. From China to Finland, people like these defined the meaning of "refugee."

No one could wish to see even a pale imitation of such anguish again. In the Middle East, there would be no high explosive, no concentration camps, but the imagined, expected scene was bad enough; lice and rickets and tuberculosis, bodies rotting in the heat, the apathy of despair. 

Why, in 1961, did I have such a picture of the Palestinian refugees? 

Obviously from what I had read, as one of the average absorbent reading public; notions float in the air exactly as dust does. Nothing that I had read or heard prepared me for what I found.

What do they look like, the undifferentiated mass known as the "Palestinian Refugee Problem"? What do they think, feel, say? What do they want? How do they live, where do they live, what do they do? Who takes care of them? What future can they hope for, in terms of reality, not in terms of slogans, which are meaningless if not actually fatal, as we know.

The children are as fast as birds, irreverent as monkeys, large-eyed, ready to laugh. The young girls, trained by carrying water jars or other heavy household bundles on their heads, move like ballerinas and are shrouded in modesty and silence as if in cocoons. The young men, crudely or finely formed, have in common the hopefulness and swagger of their new manhood. The middle years seem nondescript, in both sexes. 

After this the women, who age quickly but not as quickly as the men, wear unpainted experience on their faces; they look patient, humorous, and strong. When the men have grown visibly old, they turn into a race of grandees. Their color, infant to patriarch, ranges from golden fair to mahogany dark, all warmed by the glaze of sun. The instinct for hospitality, the elegance of manner have not been exaggerated.

UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), inheriting its role from previous caretakers, has been the splendid mother-and-father of these people for eleven years. In the course of its parenthood UNRWA has spent about $360 million on the Arab refugees, this money having been contributed by members of the United Nations, with smaller but loving donations from private charitable organizations as well. 

Of the total the United States provided more than $238 million, Great Britain over $65 million--but spread across the years and in varying amounts, sixty-one states, including Israel and the Holy See, have helped with cash. 

The Soviet Union has never paid one cent. This is a tiny note of malice: Arab refugees often express tender emotions for the Soviet Union, whereas most of the village orators blame the United States and England, or that bogey, "Western Imperialism," for their exile.

In the so-called "host countries," Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, UNRWA runs fifty-eight refugee camps. The camps in Egypt are not in Egypt but in the Gaza Strip, which is Palestine; Egypt is the de facto mandatory power, the land and the government of the Gaza Strip are Palestinian. The majority of camps in Jordan are also on what was the territory of Palestine, now annexed to Jordan.

UNRWA has never yet been allowed to make a total proper census of its refugee population, so statistics about the number of ex-Palestinians are nothing except the best estimate possible; UNRWA itself says this.

Over half of the registered Palestinian refugees do not live in camps, but have made more or less comfortable private arrangements varying from first-class houses, at the top, to hand-built Hooverville shacks, at the bottom. 

UNRWA calculates that, at the end of June, 1960, 421,500 refugees were living in their camps, almost double their camp population ten years ago. 

The advantage of living in a camp is that life there is rent free; and for the poor, the standard of housing and sanitation in an UNRWA camp is better than that of the native population.

I wanted to visit Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the ones who stayed behind, the non-refugees. Seeing them at home, I thought I might better understand the mentality of their brothers in exile. Some important clue was lacking, but I could not name it or define it.

On this tour, I visited a Christian Arab village near the Lebanese frontier; a Muslim Arab village on the coastal plain near Acre; two Muslim villages near the Jordanian frontier; a new Muslim settlement near Tel Aviv -the exact copy of a new Jewish settlement, built by the government; and a Roman Catholic priest, in the beautiful Crusader city of Acre.

My idea was to search out Arab school teachers, on the grounds that they would probably speak English, were educated men, would know the feelings of their communities, and would have thought about Arab problems. Arabs, living in their own communities, have their own schools, by their own wish, where the children are taught in Arabic, according to Arab principles. Nissim, my driver, was to serve as translator until I had found someone I could talk to; he was then to disappear. I did not want anyone to feel hampered by his alien presence. I might have spared myself anxiety. The candor of the Arabs is proof of their freedom inside the state of Israel; they are not in the least cowed.

In the Christian Arab village, the school teacher was an attractive lean young man, with prematurely gray hair, working in his garden in the cool of the evening. He had a good modern house, a young modern wife, and after six years of marriage, a first baby, a six-months-old girl named Mary, whom he and his wife so adored that neither of them took their eyes off the child at the same moment. He was healthy, prosperous, respected, freely doing his chosen work, loved and loving; by any standards, a fortunate man. After hours of listening to him, I had grasped the lacking clue, and felt hopeless.

"Great Britain helped the Jews," he said. "The English gave weapons to the Arab countries, and they gave weapons to us. In this village we were all armed; we all fired at the Jews, every one of us. But our bullets were no good; the English gave bad bullets to the Arabs. Four out of five of the bullets were no good. When we saw this, we ran away to Lebanon for two weeks and then we came back."

"Were any of you killed in these battles?"

"No, no one. Yes, we refused Partition. We did not want the Jews here; we wanted the whole country for ourselves, as is right. We only lost because of the United Nations and the Western powers.

"The Ottoman Empire crushed the pride of the Arabs. The Western powers divided the Arabs into many nations, after the First World War, to keep them weak. In the 1948 war, the next village was bombed by the Jews; when we saw that, we knew we had no hope."

(Pause for breath: the Jewish Air Force at the time consisted of nineteen Piper Cubs, a nice little plane, not a bomber; the next village was a good seven or eight miles away.)

"Now we have military zones, all along the frontiers. We must ask for permission to travel or work in different places. They have taken our land which is in the military zones. Yes, they pay for it, but very cheaply."

"At the price it used to be worth in the Mandate? Before it was improved by the Jews?"

"Something like that. No, even cheaper. Just now two boys from this village were caught on the Lebanese frontier; the Lebanese police sent them back. The Israelis are holding them for interrogation. How could such boys be spies?"

"I don't know. But you do remember that the Arab countries are at war with Israel? I should think it might be hard for the Jews to know what Arabs they could trust."

"They are right not to trust 50 per cent of the Arabs in this country."

"How can they know which 50 per cent?"

"Oh, they know everything. They have a C.I.D. agent in every Arab village. He is a Jew, and everyone knows him."

"What's the use of having a secret policeman if everyone knows he's a secret policeman?"

"There are plenty of informers. I don't know what it is that has taught all Arabs to be spies." He said this with real despair.

"There is compulsory education in this country up to the age of fourteen. That is a very good thing. We did not have such a thing before. But the Muslims do not send their girls to school half the time and do not send the boys if they can earn. Then what? The fine for the father is only five pounds. What is five pounds to the father?"

"Have you ever visited the Arab countries? Have you been to Egypt?"

We drank more coffee; we lit more cigarettes. I braced myself for further enlightenment.

"The Arab Kings were not the true representatives of the Arab peoples when they made war against Israel. Now all the refugees should come back and we should have Partition."

At this point, I decided to make one long, determined stand to see whether there was any meeting ground of minds on a basis of mutually accepted facts and reasoning.

"Please bear with me and help me," said I. "I am a simple American, and I am trying to understand how the Arab mind works, and I am finding it very difficult. I want to put some things in order; if I have everything wrong, you will correct me. In 1947, the United Nations recommended the Partition of Palestine. 

I have seen the Partition map and studied it. I cannot tell, but it does not look to me as if the Arabs were being cheated of their share of good land. 

The idea was that this division would work, if both Jews and Arabs The idea was that this division would work, if both Jews and Arabs accepted it and lived under an Economic Union. 

And, of course, the Arab countries around the borders would have to be peaceful and cooperative or else nothing would work at all. The Jews accepted this Partition plan; I suppose because they felt they had to. They were outnumbered about two to one inside the country, and there were the neighboring Arab states with five regular armies and forty million or more citizens, not feeling friendly. Are we agreed so far?"

"It is right."

"The Arab governments and the Palestinian Arabs rejected Partition absolutely. You wanted the whole country. There is no secret about this. The statements of the Arab representatives, in the UN are on record. The Arab governments never hid the fact that they started the war against Israel. But you, the Palestinian Arabs, agreed to this, you wanted it. And you thought, it seems to me very reasonably, that you would win and win quickly. It hardly seemed a gamble; it seemed a sure bet. You took the gamble and you lost. I can understand why you have all been searching for explanations of that defeat ever since, because it does seem incredible. I don't happen to accept your explanations, but that is beside the point. The point is that you lost."

"Now you say that you want to return to the past; you want Partition. So, in fact you say, let us forget that war we started, and the defeat, and, after all, we think Partition is a good, sensible idea. Please answer me this, which is what I must, know. 

If the position were reversed, if the Jews had started the war and lost it, if you had won the war, would you now accept Partition? 

Would you give up part of the country and allow the 650,000 Jewish residents of Palestine -who had fled from the war--to come back? Certainly not," he said, without an instant's hesitation. "But there would have been no Jewish refugees. They had no place to go. They would all be dead or in the sea."

It is difficult to pity the pitiless. To wring the heart past all doubt, those who cry aloud for justice must be innocent. They cannot have wished for a victorious rewarding war, blame everyone else for their defeat, and remain guiltless. 

Truth.....

Before the official Arab-Israel war started (on May 15, 1948) there had been months and months of "incidents." 

("From the first week of December 1947, disorder in Palestine had begun to mount. The Arabs repeatedly asserted that they would resist partition by force. They seemed to be determined to drive that point home by assaults upon the Jewish community in Palestine."--Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace, Macmillan, 1954.) 

By February, 1948, aside from scattered Arab attacks on scattered Jews, and reprisals for same, the "Arab Liberation Army" had moved into Palestine from the north, and Jerusalem was bombarded, besieged, and cut off. The Jews were trying to run food to the beleaguered Jewish population of Jerusalem. A lot of Jews were getting killed in that effort, in Jerusalem and elsewhere, and in the eyes of some Jews not enough was being done to prevent or avenge this. The state of Israel did not exist; no functioning Jewish government could control this anarchic, deadly phase of undeclared war.

The village of Dir Yassin lay close to besieged Jerusalem and its life-line road. According to the Irgun, Dir Yassin was a nest of snipers and armed Arabs; an effective enemy concentration. On their own, the Irgun decided to attack Dir Yassin. Their leader was killed by Arab fire from the village; the Irgun fighters then went brutally mad and shot everyone in sight. Two hundred and fifty Arabs were killed.

Well, there was much fear. Then, they all knew about Dir Yassin and expected the same to happen to them. Inside Israel, the Arabs do not need or use the refugees' stories of massacres; they do not have to account for flight, since they are still at home. They know what happened around them, and their neighbors know, and such stories would be pointless. But they do speak of Dir Yassin, which was a genuine massacre and took place in the village of that name, near Jerusalem, on April 9, 1948.

The news of Dir Yassin spread like the tolling of a funeral bell throughout Arab Palestine. According to their own ethical code and practice of war, Dir Yassin must have seemed a natural portent of the future to the Arabs. They intended to massacre the Jews; if the Jews were victorious, obviously they would massacre the Arabs. As the beautiful schoolteacher pointed out, Dir Yassin threw the fear of death into vast numbers of the Arab population. In panic, they fled from Palestine.

If there was the choice between a big financial compensation or return, only 50 per cent of the refugees would wish to return, and most of those who came back would not stay. "They could not endure how this country is run. The discipline. The work." The refugees are kept thinking of Palestine by the Arab leaders, by propaganda.