The notion of an inherent "right to exist" in regards to Pakistan, India, and Israel

Pakistan is a Moslem country and India is a primary Hindu nation how is their the notion of an inherent "right to exist" different from that regarding Israel?

While the concept of a state's "right to exist" isn't explicitly codified in international law as a standalone right for any state, the circumstances of their formation and the subsequent international acceptance lead to different political and legal realities concerning their existence.

Here's how the situations of Pakistan, India, and Israel differ in terms of the "notion of an inherent right to exist":

India and Pakistan: Basis of Formation: 

India and Pakistan were formed in 1947 through the partition of British India upon its independence. 

This was a direct result of British colonial policy and the culmination of decades of independence movements, particularly the demand for a separate Muslim homeland (Pakistan) due to fears of Hindu majority dominance in a united India.

Self-Determination of Existing Communities: 

Their formation was largely seen as an act of self-determination for the Hindu-majority population of India and the Muslim-majority population of Pakistan (though with massive displacement and violence). 

The legitimacy of their existence stems from this decolonization process and the immediate, widespread international recognition as sovereign states.

Lack of Fundamental Challenge to Existence: 

While India and Pakistan have a deeply contentious relationship, marked by wars and ongoing disputes (especially over Kashmir), the fundamental right of either state to exist is generally not questioned by the international community as a whole. 

Their borders and sovereignty are recognized, and disputes revolve around territory and specific policies, not the legitimacy of their statehood itself. 

Even when relations are at their worst, the idea of one nation ceasing to exist is not typically part of the mainstream international discourse or a stated aim of either government (though some extremist elements might hold such views).

Israel: Basis of Formation: 

Israel's formation in 1948 was also rooted in a form of self-determination – that of the Jewish people to establish a national home in their ancestral land, Zionism. 

However, unlike India and Pakistan, it emerged from the British Mandate for Palestine, a territory also claimed by the Arab Palestinian population who also sought self-determination.

International Mandate and UN Resolution: 

Key to Israel's legal argument for its existence are the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine (which explicitly recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people to the land and the grounds for reconstituting their national home), and the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181). The Partition Plan recommended the creation of both a Jewish and an Arab state. While the Jewish leadership accepted the plan, the Arab states and Palestinian leadership rejected it, leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

Contested Legitimacy from Neighboring States: 

Unlike India and Pakistan, Israel's very "right to exist" has been systematically denied by a significant number of its immediate neighbors and some other nations for decades. This denial often stems from the narrative that Israel's creation involved the displacement of Palestinians and the perceived injustice of a Jewish state being established on land also claimed by Arabs. While some Arab states have since recognized Israel (Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco), the foundational challenge to its legitimacy persists from many others and from significant portions of Palestinian society.

"Right to Exist" as a Political Assertion: For Israel, the assertion of its "right to exist" is not just a legal formality but a critical political and security statement. It is a demand for acceptance of its fundamental legitimacy as a sovereign nation-state of the Jewish people, especially in the face of movements and ideologies that seek its dissolution. This makes the "right to exist" a more highly charged and frequently invoked concept in the Israeli context than it is for India or Pakistan.

Key Differences Summarized:

Acceptance by Neighbors: India and Pakistan, despite their conflicts, generally accept each other's statehood. Israel, for many decades, faced fundamental rejection of its existence by a large bloc of its neighbors and the wider Arab/Muslim world.

Narrative of Formation: 

While all three involved complex historical processes and often violent partitions, the narrative surrounding Israel's formation is heavily intertwined with the ongoing Palestinian national aspirations, leading to a direct clash over land and legitimacy that doesn't exist in the same way between India and Pakistan.

Political vs. Legal Emphasis: 

For India and Pakistan, their existence is a given, legally and politically.

For Israel, while legally established and recognized by many, its "right to exist" remains a prominent political assertion due to continuous challenges to its fundamental legitimacy by some actors.

In essence, while the legal framework for statehood (sovereignty, recognition, territorial integrity) applies to all three, the political and historical context of their formation and subsequent relations means that the "notion of an inherent 'right to exist'" plays out very differently. For Israel, it's a constant affirmation against denial, whereas for India and Pakistan, it's an accepted premise, even amidst severe bilateral disputes.

Why did the Arabs of Palestine not proclaim a "Palestinian State" in 1948

 Question: Why did the Arabs of Palestine who lost the war in 1948 not proclaim a "Palestinian State" in the territory left them? The West Bank and Gaza?

This is another critical question that highlights the complex and often tragic turns of Palestinian history after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. While the Arabs of Palestine undoubtedly aspired to self-determination, they did not proclaim a state in the West Bank and Gaza after 1948 for several significant reasons:

Mainly the occupation by neighboring Arab States: The "West Bank" which included the Old City and East Jerusalem was conquered by Transjordan: 

After the 1948 war, Transjordan (which became Jordan in 1949) who had conquered the area, renamed the area as "the West Bank". King Abdullah I had long harbored ambitions to expand his kingdom and integrate the previous Mandated Area. In 1950, Jordan formally annexed the disputed Mandated Areas and renamed it the "West Bank". This annexation was not widely recognized except for the United Kingdom and Pakistan. For nearly two decades (until 1967), the West Bank was administered as part of Jordan. Palestinians living there were granted Jordanian citizenship.

Gaza Strip by Egypt: The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian military administration after the 1948 war. Egypt maintained a military governor in Gaza but did not formally annex the territory. Palestinians in Gaza were not granted Egyptian citizenship and remained largely stateless, although they were allowed to attend Egyptian universities.

Pan-Arabism and the "Greater Arab" Cause:

At the time, the dominant political ideology in the Arab world was Pan-Arabism, which emphasized the unity of all Arab peoples. Many Arab leaders, including those in power in Egypt and Jordan, believed that the ultimate goal was the liberation of all of Palestine and the establishment of a single, unified Arab state, rather than a separate, smaller Palestinian state. Proclaiming a separate Palestinian state in the remaining territories might have been seen as legitimizing the partition and conceding the rest of Palestine to Israel.

The Arab League even attempted to establish an "All-Palestine Government" in Gaza in September 1948, headed by Haj Amin al-Husseini, but this was largely a symbolic entity without real power, seated in Cairo and entirely dependent on Egypt. It was short-lived and ultimately abolished by Nasser in 1959.

Lack of Unified Palestinian Leadership and Institutions:

The Palestinian leadership was fractured and weakened after the 1948 defeat and the displacement of a large portion of the population. Many key leaders went into exile.

There were no strong, independent Palestinian political institutions on the ground in the West Bank or Gaza that could effectively declare and govern a state in defiance of their powerful Arab occupiers.

Focus on the Right of Return and the "Liberation" of all Palestine:

For the vast majority of Palestinians who became refugees, and for the broader Arab world, the immediate focus after 1948 was not on establishing a state in the small remaining fragments of Palestine, but on securing the right of return for the refugees and ultimately "liberating" all of historic Palestine from Israeli control.

Accepting a state in the West Bank and Gaza might have been perceived as abandoning the rights of the refugees and legitimizing Israel's existence on the majority of the land.

External Control and Strategic Interests of Arab States:

Jordan and Egypt, as occupying powers, had their own strategic interests. 

Jordan aimed to consolidate its control over the West Bank, integrating it into its kingdom. 

Egypt found the Gaza Strip to be a burden, but it was strategically important as a buffer zone and a base for Palestinian fedayeen operations. Neither wanted to cede control to a fledgling Palestinian entity that might challenge their authority or draw them into further conflict.

In essence, the Palestinians in 1948-1967 were in a difficult position: their territory was controlled by powerful Arab neighbors who had their own agendas, their leadership was dispersed, and the overriding goal for many was the "liberation" of all of Palestine, not merely the creation of a mini-state in the remnants. It wasn't until after the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, that the idea of a distinct Palestinian state in those territories began to gain significant traction within the Palestinian national movement, largely through the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Judaea and Shomron -International Law and the "Occupied Territories"

As the treaty of Lausance IS international Law, the previous Mandated Area of Judaea and Shomron part of the "future Homeland of the Jewish people" refused by the Arabs of the Mandated Areas and conqured and illegally occupied by the Jordanians -who called the "Disputed territories" the West Bank. 

According to International Law does this area NOT legally belong to Israel?

This is a complex question with deeply contested legal and political interpretations. 

While the Treaty of Lausanne is indeed international law, its direct application to the current status of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank ) is not straightforward and is subject to significant debate among international legal scholars and political actors.

Here's a breakdown of the key arguments and considerations:

1. The Treaty of Lausanne and the Mandate for Palestine:

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) formally ended the war between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire. Crucially, it meant Turkey relinquished all claims to its former territories outside its new borders, including those that would become the British Mandate for Palestine.

The Mandate for Palestine, assigned to Britain by the League of Nations in 1922, explicitly incorporated the Balfour Declaration, which called for the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people" in British Mandated Territory known as "Palestine".

The Mandate recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people to the land and aimed to facilitate Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land.

Proponents of Israel's claim often argue that the Mandate, with its emphasis on a Jewish national home, provided an international legal basis for Jewish self-determination in the territory. 

They contend that the areas west of the Jordan River, including Judea and Samaria, were part of this designated "future Homeland of the Jewish people."

2. The Jordanian Occupation and "Disputed Territories":

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jordan occupied and later annexed the West Bank (which it called the "West Bank"), including East Jerusalem. This annexation was largely not recognized internationally (except by a few states like the UK and Pakistan).

Israel argues that because Jordan's annexation was illegal, the West Bank was not sovereign Jordanian territory when Israel captured it in the 1967 Six-Day War. Therefore, Israel views the territory as "disputed" or "unallocated" rather than "occupied" in the traditional sense of occupying another sovereign state's land.

3. International Law and the "Occupied Territories" Consensus:

The prevailing international legal consensus, supported by the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and most states, regards the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) as occupied Palestinian territory.

This view rests on the principle of "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and other international legal instruments.

The Fourth Geneva Convention, which regulates the conduct of an occupying power, is widely considered applicable to Israel's presence in the West Bank by the international community. 

Article 49(6) of this convention prohibits an occupying power from transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. 

This is the basis for the pro-Arab (Balestinian Point of View) biased international community's view that Israeli "settlements" in the West Bank are illegal.

Recent rulings by the ICJ based SOLELY on the pro-Arab (Balestinian Point of View), including its advisory opinion in July 2024, have reaffirmed the illegality of Israel's "occupation" of the Palestinian territories, its settlement regime, and its policies, stating that they violate international law.

Conclusion:

This framework, while universally applied to other occupations, is selectively and unfairly applied to Israel, effectively ignoring historical Jewish claims and security concerns.

While historical documents like the Treaty of Lausanne and the Mandate for Palestine are part of the complex historical and legal background, the dominant, pro-Arab (Balestinian) Point of  view, in international law regarding the "Disputed Territories" aka the West Bank, is that it is "occupied" territory.

Therefore, according to the prevailing pro-Arab (Balestinian) false narration the interpretation of international law in the international community, the area does not legally belong to Israel in the sense of sovereign annexation. 

Its final status is considered a matter for negotiations between the parties involved, aiming for a resolution that respects the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people but blithely ignores that of the Jews and Israel!

It's important to acknowledge that Israel disputes this pro-Arab (Balestinian) false narration interpretation, by presenting its own legal arguments based on historical claims, security needs, and the lack of a recognized prior sovereign over the territory. 

However, this Israeli position remains a minority view within the international legal framework.

The "prevailing international legal view" tends to emphasize Palestinian self-determination while seemingly downplaying or overlooking the historical and national rights of the Jewish people, which were indeed recognized in earlier international instruments.

Transfer of the Arabs of Judea and Shomron-historical reciprocity

If the Arabs expelled the Jews from Arab countries and by Jordanian Law ALL residents of the previous Jordanian occupied West Bank were made citizens of Jordan. Why should Israel not expell them to Jordan?

This is a very sensitive and complex area, often raised in arguments against Palestinian claims, particularly concerning historical reciprocity and the concept of "transfer" (expulsion). Let's break down the different legal, historical, and ethical dimensions of the question.

1. The Jewish Exodus from Arab Countries:

It is a well-documented historical fact that, following the establishment of Israel in 1948, and often in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict, approximately 850,000 Jews were expelled, fled, or were forced to leave Arab and Muslim-majority countries across the Middle East and North Africa. This was often accompanied by confiscation of property, discrimination, and violence. Most of these Jewish refugees were absorbed by Israel. This historical event is often referred to as the "Jewish Nakba" by some, drawing a parallel to the Palestinian narrative of "displacement".

2. Jordanian Citizenship for West Bank Residents (1948-1988):

After Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950 (an annexation largely unrecognized internationally), it extended Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinian residents of the West Bank. This continued until Jordan officially relinquished its claims to the West Bank in 1988, in favor of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

3. Why Israel Should Not Expel Palestinians to Jordan (from an international law and ethical perspective):

Despite the historical grievances and the points you raise, the overwhelming consensus of international law and most of the international community would strongly condemn and oppose any forced expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan, for several key reasons:

• Prohibition of Forced Displacement/Ethnic Cleansing:

  • International Humanitarian Law (IHL): The Fourth Geneva Convention, which governs belligerent occupation, explicitly prohibits the individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations of protected persons from occupied territory. This is considered a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and a war crime.
  • Customary International Law: The prohibition of forced displacement and ethnic cleansing is considered a fundamental principle of customary international law, binding on all states.
  • Rome Statute: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lists "deportation or forcible transfer of population" as a crime against humanity and a war crime.

• Right to Self-Determination: Palestinians are recognized under international law as a people with the right to self-determination. Forcibly expelling them from their homes and land would directly violate this fundamental right.

• "Terra Nullius" is Rejected: As discussed previously, the West Bank is not terra nullius. It is inhabited territory with a distinct population.

• No Reciprocity in Law: While the historical injustices faced by Jewish communities in Arab countries are undeniable, international law does not operate on a principle of "reciprocal injustice." One wrong (the expulsion of Jews from Arab countries) does not legally justify another wrong (the expulsion of Palestinians). Each action is judged on its own merits under international legal frameworks.

• Humanitarian Catastrophe: Such an act would constitute a massive humanitarian catastrophe, creating millions of new refugees and destabilizing the entire region, leading to widespread international condemnation and potentially severe consequences for Israel.

• Jordan's Position: Jordan has repeatedly stated that it will not accept the mass transfer of Palestinians and views such a move as a threat to its own stability. Jordan already hosts a large Palestinian population, many of whom are citizens, but it distinguishes between its citizens and the residents of the West Bank.

4. The "Transfer" Concept within Israeli Discourse:

While not mainstream government policy, the idea of "transferring" Palestinians (often implicitly to Jordan) has existed as a fringe idea within some segments of Israeli political thought, particularly on the far-right. This concept is overwhelmingly rejected by mainstream Israeli politics and by the international community due to the reasons outlined above.

In summary:

The historical facts you raise (expulsion of Jews from Arab countries and Jordanian citizenship for West Bank residents) are important for understanding the complex historical context and the deep sense of grievance felt by many Israelis. 

However, under current international law and widely accepted ethical norms, these facts do not provide a legal or moral justification for Israel to forcibly expel Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. Such an act would be considered a grave violation of international law, a war crime, and would lead to unprecedented humanitarian and geopolitical consequences.

Why should Israel give in to the demands of the Palestinians?

 As the Palestinians refused the partition and have attacked Israel many times why should Israel give in to the demands of the Palestinians?

Key historical points that are indeed central to the Israeli perspective and objections to Palestinian demands: the Palestinian refusal of the 1947 UN Partition Plan and the history of Arab aggression against Israel. 

These are crucial elements in understanding why many Israelis feel that concessions are unwarranted or even dangerous.

From Israel's perspective, the narrative often emphasizes:

• Rejection of the Partition Plan: The 1947 UN Partition Plan offered a two-state solution, with both an Arab and a Jewish state. Israel accepted it, but the Arab leadership and surrounding Arab states rejected it, leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. From this viewpoint, the Palestinians (and the Arab world) missed an opportunity for statehood and initiated a conflict aimed at preventing the existence of a Jewish state.
• Wars of Aggression: Israel views subsequent wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973) as instances of Arab aggression aimed at its destruction. In 1967, Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in what it sees as a defensive war.
• Security Concerns: Given the history of attacks, including terrorism and rocket fire, Israel prioritizes its security. Conceding territory, especially strategic high ground in the West Bank, is seen by many as a direct threat to Israeli security. They argue that a Palestinian state, if not adequately demilitarized and secured, could become a base for further attacks.
• Unreliability of Palestinian Leadership: Some Israelis view Palestinian leadership as unwilling or unable to genuinely commit to peace, citing continued incitement, rejection of past peace proposals, and the internal divisions between factions like Fatah and Hamas.
• Historical and Religious Connection to the Land: For many Israelis, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) are the historical heartland of the Jewish people, with deep religious and historical significance. Giving up these areas is seen as relinquishing an integral part of their heritage.

Why, despite these points, arguments are still made for Israel to make concessions:

While the points outlined above are valid and deeply held by many Israelis, proponents of concessions argue that they are necessary for different reasons, focusing on the future rather than solely on past grievances:

1. Ending the Occupation and Preserving Democracy: As mentioned, maintaining control over a large Palestinian population without granting them full rights threatens Israel's identity as a democratic state with a Jewish majority. A two-state solution, achieved through territorial concessions, is seen as the only way to resolve this demographic dilemma and preserve Israeli democracy.
2. Long-Term Security: While seemingly counterintuitive, many argue that continued occupation is itself a source of instability and insecurity. The ongoing resentment, frustration, and lack of a political horizon among Palestinians fuel extremism and violence. A negotiated peace, leading to a viable Palestinian state, is seen by many security experts as the best long-term security guarantee for Israel, even if it involves difficult concessions.
3. International Legitimacy and Standing: The international community overwhelmingly views the West Bank as occupied territory and settlements as illegal. Continued control without a clear path to statehood for Palestinians leads to international isolation, diplomatic pressure, and legal challenges (e.g., at the International Criminal Court). Concessions would bring Israel closer to international norms and improve its global standing.
4. Moral and Ethical Considerations: Many within Israel and abroad argue that continued occupation and the associated limitations on Palestinian life raise significant moral and ethical questions. Concessions could be seen as upholding universal human rights and principles of justice.
5. Avoiding a One-State Reality: If a two-state solution becomes impossible due to continued settlement expansion or other factors, the only alternative is a de facto one-state reality. This could either lead to a loss of Israel's Jewish character (if Palestinians are granted full rights) or an apartheid-like system (if they are not), both of which are seen as detrimental to Israel's future.
6. Potential for Regional Peace and Prosperity: A resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often seen as a key to unlocking broader regional peace and economic cooperation between Israel and other Arab nations, even those that have signed normalization agreements.

In conclusion, the debate over Israeli concessions is not about ignoring past Palestinian actions or denying Israel's legitimate security concerns. Instead, it's about whether those past actions and current fears should dictate the entire future of the region, or if a different approach, involving difficult compromises, might ultimately serve Israel's long-term interests (security, democracy, international standing) more effectively.

Palestian Refusal to Peace

Why have the "Arabs of the mandated Areas" "Palestinians" consistently refused to accept the territory they occupy as a finality and declare their state?

The reasons why "Arabs of the mandated Areas"  have consistently refused to accept various territorial proposals and declare a state on the territory they currently occupy are deeply rooted in their "false" historical narrative, national aspirations, and a series of perceived injustices. 

Here's a breakdown of the key factors:

1. Historical Grievances and the "Nakba" (Catastrophe):

"Loss of Land" in 1948:

"Arabs of the mandated Areas" view the 1948 war (which they call the Nakba) as a catastrophic event that led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arab residents and the loss of much of "their" ancestral land. 

They contend that the establishment of Israel came at their expense and that the UN Partition Plan, which allocated a portion of land to a Jewish state despite Arabs being the majority population and "owning" most of the land, was inherently unjust.

Refugee Issue: The "right of return" for those Arab refugees "displaced" in 1948 and subsequent conflicts is a central and non-negotiable demand for most Palestinians.

Accepting a state solely on the "West Bank" and Gaza without addressing the refugee issue would be seen as abandoning a core component of their national identity and rights.

2. The Scope of Proposed Territories and Borders:

1967 Borders: Palestinians insist on a state based on the 1967 borders (pre-Six-Day War "cease-fire" lines), with East Jerusalem as its capital. This is the internationally recognized basis for a two-state solution.

Israeli "Settlements": The continuous expansion of Israeli settlements in the "West Bank" and East Jerusalem since 1967 is a major obstacle to the "Palestinians", who view these settlements as illegal under international law and as actively eroding the contiguity and viability of a future Palestinian state. They argue that accepting a state with the current settlement blocs would mean accepting a significantly diminished and fragmented territory.

Land Swaps: While land swaps are often part of peace proposals, Palestinians have often found the proposed swaps to be insufficient in quality or quantity to compensate for the land taken by settlements, or that they further compromise the contiguity of their state.

Jerusalem: The status of Jerusalem is a highly emotional and religious issue for both sides. Palestinians demand East Jerusalem as the capital of their state, given its historical and religious significance. Israeli claims over all of Jerusalem are seen as a direct violation of Palestinian rights and aspirations.

3. Sovereignty and Viability of a Future State:

Lack of Full Sovereignty: 

Peace proposals, particularly those offered by Israel, have often included limitations on the sovereignty of a future Palestinian state, especially regarding security, airspace, and borders. Palestinians argue that these limitations would render their state a "Bantustan" or a non-viable entity, not a truly independent nation.

Economic Viability: 

The fragmentation of the West Bank due to settlements, checkpoints, and restrictions on movement, along with the isolation of Gaza, raises serious concerns about the economic viability of a future Palestinian state.

Security Concerns: While Israel insists on security arrangements, Palestinians often view these as disproportionate and infringing on their sovereignty.

4. Leadership and Internal Divisions:

Lack of a United Front: 

Palestinian leadership has historically been fragmented, with different factions holding varying degrees of willingness to compromise. The division between Fatah (governing the West Bank) and Hamas (governing Gaza) further complicates any unified approach to peace negotiations.

Fear of Being Perceived as "Sell-Outs": Palestinian leaders face immense pressure from their population and other factions not to concede on core demands. 

Accepting a deal perceived as less than optimal could lead to accusations of betrayal and destabilize their leadership.

Lack of Trust:

Decades of conflict, failed agreements, and continued occupation have fostered deep mistrust between the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships, making it difficult to reach and implement comprehensive agreements.

5. International Law and Principles:

Right to Self-Determination: 

Palestinians consistently emphasize their internationally recognized right to self-determination in the entire territory occupied in 1967. They believe that accepting less would be a betrayal of this fundamental right.

Illegality of Occupation and Settlements: The international community largely views the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as illegal and the settlements as a violation of international law. Palestinians use this legal framework to justify their demands and reject proposals that do not fully address these issues.

In essence, for many Palestinians, accepting a state on fragmented territory with limited sovereignty, without addressing the refugee issue, and without East Jerusalem as its capital, would be seen as legitimizing the consequences of their historical dispossession and sacrificing their core national aspirations for a truly independent and viable state.

What did the Treaty of Sèvres (San Remo conference) and the Treaty of Lausanne say about Judaea and Shomron (the West Bank)?

Neither the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) nor the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) directly addressed the status of the Judaea and Shomron as a distinct entity. This is because the term "West Bank" only emerged later, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, to refer to Judaea and Shomron as the territory west of the Jordan River that was occupied by Jordan.

Here's what those agreements did say in relation to the broader region: San Remo Conference (1920) and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920):

Dismantling the Ottoman Empire: The Treaty of Sèvres was a post-World War I pact that formally dismantled the Ottoman Empire.

Creation of Mandates: The San Remo Conference (which preceded and laid the groundwork for Sèvres) determined the allocation of Class "A" League of Nations mandates for the administration of former Ottoman territories.

British Mandate for Palestine: 

The significant outcome for the area now known as the "West Bank" was the British Mandate for Palestine. This mandate, approved at San Remo, incorporated the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which expressed support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

Boundaries of Palestine: 

The Mandate for Palestine encompassed the area that would later be divided into present-day Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as Transjordan (present-day Jordan). 

Importantly, Transjordan (east of the Jordan River) was later excluded from the provisions for a Jewish national home within the Mandate.

The Treaty of Sèvres, though signed, was ultimately rejected by Turkish nationalists and never fully ratified.

Treaty of Lausanne (1923): replaced the Treaty of Sèvres. 

It was the final treaty concluding World War I and was signed by Turkey (the successor to the Ottoman Empire) and the Allied powers that recognized the boundaries of the modern state of Turkey.

Renunciation of Former Arab Provinces: 

Crucially, Turkey renounced all claims to its former Arab provinces, including those that fell under the British Mandate for Palestine. This solidified the international recognition of the British Mandate over Palestine, which included the territory that would later become the West Bank.

In summary, while the terms "West Bank" did not exist at the time, the San Remo Conference and the Treaty of Sèvres (though superseded) established the framework for the British Mandate for Palestine, which included the geographical area that would eventually become the West Bank. 

The Treaty of Lausanne confirmed Turkey's renunciation of claims to these territories, thereby reinforcing the international legitimacy of the Mandate. 

The current status of the West Bank is a result of later events, including the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1949 Armistice Agreements, Jordan's annexation of the territory, and the 1967 Six-Day War and subsequent Israeli Liberation from Jordanian occupation.

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