The truth of the "Nachba" Myth-making to Political Realism.

A comparison of the leaflet by the Grand Mufti in 1948 to that of Mahmoud Abbas in 1976 reveals a transition from the mobilizing, martial Arabic of the Mufti to the introspective, critical prose of Mahmoud Abbas.

The most striking difference is in the "Focus of blame". The shift from externalizing blame (1948) to internalizing it (1976) represents a massive psychological and political evolution within the Palestinian movement.

The Mufti (1948):  The Mufti frames the disaster as an external "unjust resolution" imposed by the UN and the "brutal Zionist entity" which makes the catastrophe feel like an act of nature or a foreign crime. 

The Mufti removed agency from the Arab leadership By framing the 1948 events through the lens of "Fate" and "External Aggression.

In his narrative, the Palestinians were victims of a "natural disaster" or a "foreign crime." This allowed him to maintain a facade of infallible leadership even in the face of total military collapse.

His document is a "Call to Arms" of blame as a that ignores internal failures. 

In the 1948 leaflet, blame is used as a mobilization tool. The Mufti directs 100% of the responsibility toward external actors:

• The United Nations: Blamed for the "unjust resolution" (Partition).
• The Zionists: Blamed for "brutal colonialism."
• Fate/Providence:
• The blood of the ancestors "determined its fate."

The Goal of this Focus: 

To create a unified front. By blaming only the outsider, the Mufti attempted to gloss over the tactical weaknesses and internal divisions of the Arab Higher Committee.

In contrast to the leaflet of the Mufti, Abbas’s article uses the Active Voice to describe the "Active Betrayal" by the Arab League states.

Abbas "Post-Mortem" serves a specific 1970s political purpose as he deconstructs the "Myth of the Nachba", becuase in actuality it was the Arab states who were the ones who "displaced" and "imprisoned" the Palestinians.

Abbas stated that the Arab states have no moral or political right to dictate the future of the Palestinian movement.

Abbas, writing in the PLO’s central newspaper, 28 years later, places the blame as a "Post-Mortem" as he turns the lens inward toward self-criticism and regional betrayal. 

In his article Abbas uses an "Active Voice" when discussing the Arab states ("They displaced them," "They threw them into prisons," "They succeeded in tearing apart"). 

This shift in grammar reflects a shift in political accountability as he targets:

The Arab Armies: He explicitly blames them for the physical act of displacement ("they forced them to emigrate").

The Arab States: Blamed for the "political and intellectual siege" and the "ghettos." The use of the word "Ghetto" and it's associated imagery is the ultimate internalization of blame.

By comparing Arab refugee camps to European Jewish ghettos, he accuses the Arab world of adopting the tactics of the very "Zionist entity" they claimed to be fighting. It transforms the Arab states from "brothers" into "occupiers" of a different sort. 

It suggests that the Arab world did not just fail to defeat the Zionists; it adopted the very methods of the "enemy" (European-style Jewish ghettos confinement) by forcing Palestinians into refugee camps to control them.

Arab Propaganda: 

Abbas critiques and mocks the Arab leadership, for their "blaring broadcasts" that promised victory accusing them of "putting the Arab public to sleep" with empty radio broadcasts about "throwing the Jews into the sea"

This is a direct jab at Ahmad Shukeiri (the first chairman of the PLO) and Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs) radio in Cairo. Abbas argued that rhetoric the use ofthe phrase  ("throwing Jews into the sea") was actually a weapon used against the Palestinian people to keep them docile while their interests were being sacrificed by regional powers.

The goal of this focus on the "blaring broadcasts" was in the blaming of the Arab states for the 1948 disaster.

The Haifa C.I.D. report report notes that Arab leaders "reiterated their determination to evacuate" and requested British trucks to do so. 

Abbas’s 1976 article effectively admits what the British police recorded in real-time in 1948—an admission that the Mufti’s 1948 rhetoric was designed to obscure serves as a "confession" that validates the 1948 British intelligence reports. By dismantling the externalized blame of the Mufti, Abbas effectively verified the reality on the ground in Haifa that the British C.I.D. and Golda Meir had documented decades earlier.

Abbas identifies the Arab League not as failed saviors, but as active participants in the displacement. When he writes that the Arab armies "forced them to emigrate," he aligns his narrative with the C.I.D. report’s observation of Arab leaders’ "determination to evacuate."

In conclusion:

The Haifa C.I.D. Report is the "smoking gun" of 1948, showing the logistical reality of the evacuation. 

The Mufti’s Leaflet is the "propaganda shield" that attempted to hide that reality behind a curtain of sacred duty and external blame. 

Mahmoud Abbas’s 1976 Article is the "historical reckoning" .