Israeli Aircraft

To all the "Armchair generals" "But I know it alls" allow me to provide facts.

We do NOT require a "B-52" an aircraft originally designed in the early 1950's! Nor an overly expensive B-2.

As in the past we have seen how our own Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) has a rich history of designing and producing superior military aircraft, thereby playing a crucial role in Israel's defense.

IAI is world particularly renowned for it's revolutionary production of "UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) and improvements on American produced aircraft like the F-15I and F-35I.

While  Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) have also produced civilian aircraft and converted various types for cargo, their contributions to military aircraft upgrades are particularly notable.

Here are some of the key military aircraft designed and built by IAI over the years:

IAI Nesher: This was IAI's first fighter jet, essentially a reverse-engineered and improved version of the French Dassault Mirage 5, after France imposed an arms embargo on Israel. It was introduced in 1971.

IAI Kfir: Building on the Nesher, the Kfir (Lion Cub) was a more advanced multi-role fighter, incorporating a stronger American J79 engine and canards for improved maneuverability. It entered service in 1975 and has been exported to several countries. Various variants exist, including the C.1, C.2, C.7, and two-seat trainers (TC.2, TC.7). Some were even leased to the US Navy and Marine Corps as aggressor aircraft (F-21A Lion).

IAI Lavi: This was an ambitious project for a highly advanced, lightweight, single-engine multi-role fighter. It was intended to replace aircraft like the A-4 Skyhawk and Kfir in IAF service. The Lavi featured cutting-edge avionics, ELBIT electronocs, a digital fly-by-wire system, and extensive use of composite materials. 

Although two prototypes flew, the project was ultimately canceled in 1987 due to significant development costs and political pressure, particularly from the United States, which preferred Israel to purchase American-made aircraft like the F-16. 

Despite its cancellation, the Lavi program significantly advanced Israel's aerospace industry and its technologies found their way into other Israeli defense systems.

IAI Arava: This was a short take-off and landing (STOL) transport aircraft, designed for both military and civilian use. The military version was used for light transport and surveillance.

IAI Tzukit (Fouga CM.170 Magister): While originally a French design, IAI undertook licensed manufacturing of this twin-jet trainer, which became the primary trainer for the Israeli Air Force for decades. It also saw combat use as a close-support aircraft during the Six-Day War.

Beyond these fully designed aircraft, IAI is also a major player in: UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles): 

IAI has been a pioneer and global leader in drone technology, with a wide range of UAVs for reconnaissance, surveillance, and even strike capabilities. Notable examples include the Scout, Searcher, Heron (including Heron 1 and Heron TP), Harpy, and Harop.

Aircraft Upgrades and Conversions: IAI has extensive experience in upgrading and modernizing various military aircraft, often developing sophisticated avionics, electronic warfare systems, and structural modifications for both Israeli and foreign air forces. They also convert passenger aircraft into cargo aircraft for military and civilian clients.

Missile and Defense Systems Integration: IAI is heavily involved in integrating complex missile and defense systems onto various platforms, including their own and foreign-built aircraft.

It is most certainly plausabile that the IAI together with Elbit can produce a suitable UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) to carry a "Massive Ordinance Device" MOD. 

The making of a UAV capable of carrying the weight of an MOD is not to "far farfetched" take for example the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Heron TP / Eitan (Israel) which is in use today: This large MALE UAV is reported to have a very high payload capacity, with some sources indicating up to 2,700 kg (5,950 lb). It can carry multiple mission systems, including radar, intelligence sensors, and combat payloads.

There is also the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper (USA): This is one of the most well-known military UAVs. It has a significant payload capacity, capable of carrying 1,746 kg (3,850 lb), which includes 1,361 kg (3,000 lb) of external stores (weapons, sensors, etc.). It can be armed with Hellfire missiles, guided bombs, and other munitions.

The use of a manned device like the B-1 and B-2 has proven to the US Military to be costly not only in operating (flight) cost but seriosly and massively expensive in upkeep.

Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) and Israel

 More information / facts-(So you will know and understand)

First it should be stated Part of the need for the US Airforce B-2’s is that it could penetrate very deeply into Iranian airspace and strike its targets without having to execute a full air war.

It would still need major support, but, combined with standoff capabilities and stealth tactical jets, it provides an avenue to a quicker and hopefully cleaner conflict aimed at dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

The need for the B-2’s stealth qualities is drastically reduced now that Israel has declared air superiority over Iran. That doesn’t mean ground-based air defenses are not still a threat — especially road mobile, shoulder-fired, and non-traditional systems — but Iran’s overall counter-air capability has been severely degraded. Fighters and even slow-moving large drones that operate at medium altitude are now flying relatively freely over major Iranian population centers today.

It is now plausable that an Israeli Airforce C-130 "Hercules" can survive reliably deep into Iranian territory now that the IAF basically control the skies over Iran.
Therefore it would be relevant for going after those nuclear targets that standard aerial weaponry cannot reach.

The GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) could be designed to maximize the C-130’s airdrop envelope and not exceed it, and should have no problem fitting inside of and being released by a C-130.
Dropping a weapon weighing nearly 30,000 pounds out the back of a C-130 would certainly be something to behold.

One major area where the C-130 would be at a disadvantage to the B-2, beyond its survivability and ability to carry two MOPs at once, is its speed and altitude. The Hercules flies substantially lower and slower than the B-2, which would have an impact on the weapon’s overall impact force, and likely substantially so. A C-130 dropping the same weapon at 25,000 feet and 250 miles per hour will result in significantly less kinetic force of impact than a B-2 dropping the weapon at 50,000 feet and 500 miles per hour. This is a big deal for a munition that is meant to burrow down as deeply as possible into a mountain and detonate.
It isn’t clear if these performance differences would separate success from failure. It may be that just additional munitions would be needed in order to burrow down one on top of the other deeper into the mountain to hit the targeted cavity.

The GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) is a precision-guided "bunker buster" bomb primarily comprised of:

BLU-127 Bomb Body (Warhead/Penetrator Case): This is the core of the weapon, designed to penetrate deeply buried and hardened targets.
Explosive Fill: The BLU-127 bomb body contains a significant amount of high-performance polymer-bonded explosives, typically a combination of AFX-757 and PBXN-114. This explosive is optimized for controlled detonation after penetration.

Casing: The bomb's casing is made from a high-density Eglin steel alloy, specifically engineered to withstand the extreme stresses of deep penetration before detonation.

Guidance Kit: This provides the precision guidance for the bomb.
Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS): These systems work together to ensure accurate targeting, allowing the bomb to strike within meters of its intended target.

Grid Fins: These retractable fins help stabilize the bomb in flight and allow for mid-course adjustments to maintain its trajectory.

Large Penetrator Smart Fuze (LPSF): This advanced fuzing system manages the detonation timing, adjusting the moment of explosion based on impact depth and the characteristics of the underground structure.

In essence, the GBU-57 is a combination of a robust, penetrating bomb body with a powerful explosive fill, integrated with a sophisticated guidance and fuzing system for precision and optimized detonation.

Palestinian Unity and the Nachba

 After seeing countless social media posts; by the Haters of Israel Zionism and Jews -specifically those graduates of the Communist / Socialist Antifa Shahid (Martys) school for imbeciles and those fellow self-hating Jews (in Name Only) who rant and rave like the lunatics they are that the "Zionist aggression" started "70 years ago" when the "All powerful" (read American and USSR supplied and armed) Hagannah , Palmach and vilified Irgun and LECHI led to the "Great Nachba".

Those who speak of Arab "Palestinian Unity" fail to note that even before the creation of the Jewish State the competing Arab leaders; the Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini and exiled Iraqi former Prime Minister Rashid Ali had desired to divide the land between themselves and had established "armed militias" to achieve their goals.

Now for the WHOLE truth -

Iraqi former Prime Minister Rashid Ali had created the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji while the Grand Mufti had created the Army of the Holy War led by his kinsman Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni.
In addition to these two "militias", who vied for the former British Mandates Areas, where the armies of the Arab League who also vied for the conquest of the "Mandated Areas" to divide the land betwen themselves.

Abdul Qadir al-Husayni was born to the prominent and influential al-Husayni family of Jerusalem.
Abdul Qadir completed his secondary education in Jerusalem with distinction and then started at the College of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut, but did not continue his studies there. Instead, he went to and later graduated in chemistry at the American University in Cairo while organising the Congress of Educated Muslims.

Initially, he took a post in the settlement department of the British Mandate government but eventually moved to the Hebron area during the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine to lead the struggle against the British where he was a guerilla commander for the Jerusalem district in the summer 1936.
In 1938, Abdul Qadir was exiled and in 1939 moved to Iraq where he took part in the Golden Square coup d'état. He moved to Egypt in 1946, but surreptitiously returned to Palestine to lead the Army of the Holy War in January 1948.

Husayni was killed while personally reconnoitring an area of Qastal Hill shrouded by fog, in the early hours of 8 April 1948.

His forces later captured al-Qastal from the Haganah, which retreated to the Jewish settlement of Motza.
Palmach troops recaptured the village on the night of 8–9 April, losing 18 men in the attack; and the hill became a command post.

Husayni's death has been regarded as THE major factor for the loss of morale among his forces.

Fawzi al-Qawuqji was a Lebanese-born Arab nationalist who served as a colonel in the Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II, and commanded the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) during the 1948 Palestine War.

After the UN Partition vote, the Arab League appointed Fawzi al-Qawuqji to be field commander of the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) in the 1948 Palestine War. This appointment was opposed by Haj Amin Husseini, who had appointed his own kinsman Abdul Qadir al-Husseini as the commander of the Army of the Holy War.
The execution of the 1948 Palestine War was marked by the personal, family, and political rivalry between al-Qawuqji (who fought mainly in northern Palestine) and al-Husayni, who fought mostly in the Jerusalem area.

It cries out to be noted that in early March 1948, al-Qawuqji moved some of his forces from the Damascus area and crossed - unmolested by British troops- into the Mandated Area of Palestine over the Allenby Bridge on March 6 and 7, leading hundreds of Arab and Bosnian volunteers in a column of twenty-five trucks.
The British troops' inaction infuriated General Sir Gordon MacMillan, who stated that al-Qawuqji should not be allowed "to go openly rampaging over territory in which Britain considered herself a sovereign power." General MacMillan did not want to confront al-Qawuqji's force, since he cowardly saw "no point in getting a lot of British soldiers killed in that kind of operation."

Inside Mandatory Palestine, al-Qawuqji commanded a few thousand armed men who had infiltrated the area deom neighboring Arab countries. They were grouped into several regiments concentrated in Galilee and around Nablus.
According to Collins and Lapierre, Al-Qawuqji told his troops that the purpose was "ridding Palestine of the Zionist plague", and his aim was "to drive all the Jews into the sea."

On the 4th of April 1948, the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) mounted a major attack on the kibbutz Mishmar HaEmek which sat near the strategic road that connected Haifa to Jenin, and was surrounded by Arab villages.
In the attack al-Qawuqji initiated the first use of artillery during the war by directing his seven 75 and 105 mm field guns to fire on the kibbutz for a 36-hour barrage. During this battle al-Qawuqji issued a number of announcements that were subsequently proven false.
In the first 24-hours he announced victory, on April 8th he announced he had taken Mishmar HaEmek.

However after the battle was lost he claimed the Jews had been assisted by non-Jewish Soviet troops and bombers. As "Proof" al-Qawuqji claimed to have intercepted copies telegrams, but these mendaciously false "telegrams of proof" can be seen preserved in the Jordanian archives.

The Haganah and Palmach counter-attacked and the ALA were routed. The battle was over by 16 April, and most of the Arabs in the area fled, disheartened by the defeat of the ALA or demoralized by the Jewish victory. The remaining minority were expelled from the surrounding Arab villages by Jewish forces.

In July, al-Qawuqji launched a rolling offensive of counterattacks, focusing on Ilaniya (Sejera), a Jewish settlement deep in ALA territory. Although he deployed armored cars and a battery of 75 mm artillery the opposing Golani Twelfth Battalion withstood the attack, inflicting heavy losses on the ALA. The battle ended on 18 July, with the ALA losing the Arab village of Lubiya, which had been their main base in Central Eastern Galilee.

The ALA established control of upper central Galilee, from the Sakhnin–Arabe–Deir Hanna line through Majd al-Krum up to the Lebanese border until October 1948. On 22 October, the date of the third UN Security Council cease-fire order, the ALA attacked Sheikh Abd, a hilltop overlooking Kibbutz Manara and put the kibbutz under siege.

In conclusion The REAL TRUTH, in THEIR OWN WORDS, of WHY the "Arab inhabitants of the Mandated Area of Palestine" FLED!

In the memoirs of Haled al Azm, who served as Prime Minister of Syria in 1948 and 1949, that were published in Beirut in 1973. Azm admitted in his memoirs that it was actually the Arab governments who called for the palestinian Arabs to evacuate and leave by sowing terror in them.

"Five: the call by the Arab governments to the inhabitants of Palestine to evacuate it and to leave for the bordering Arab countries after sowing the terror among them, following the incident at Deir Yassin."

"Since 1948 we have been demanding the return of the refugees to their homes. But we ourselves are the ones who encouraged them to leave."

Note the closing paragraph from his memoirs:

"We have brought destruction upon a (sic) million Arab refugees by calling upon them and pleading with them to leave their land, their homes, their work and business, and we have caused them to be barren and unemployed...we accustomed them to begging for handouts and to suffice with what little the UN organization would allocate them."

The notion of an inherent "right to exist" in regards to Pakistan, India, and Israel

Pakistan is a Moslem country and India is a primary Hindu nation how is their the notion of an inherent "right to exist" different from that regarding Israel?

While the concept of a state's "right to exist" isn't explicitly codified in international law as a standalone right for any state, the circumstances of their formation and the subsequent international acceptance lead to different political and legal realities concerning their existence.

Here's how the situations of Pakistan, India, and Israel differ in terms of the "notion of an inherent right to exist":

India and Pakistan: Basis of Formation: 

India and Pakistan were formed in 1947 through the partition of British India upon its independence. 

This was a direct result of British colonial policy and the culmination of decades of independence movements, particularly the demand for a separate Muslim homeland (Pakistan) due to fears of Hindu majority dominance in a united India.

Self-Determination of Existing Communities: 

Their formation was largely seen as an act of self-determination for the Hindu-majority population of India and the Muslim-majority population of Pakistan (though with massive displacement and violence). 

The legitimacy of their existence stems from this decolonization process and the immediate, widespread international recognition as sovereign states.

Lack of Fundamental Challenge to Existence: 

While India and Pakistan have a deeply contentious relationship, marked by wars and ongoing disputes (especially over Kashmir), the fundamental right of either state to exist is generally not questioned by the international community as a whole. 

Their borders and sovereignty are recognized, and disputes revolve around territory and specific policies, not the legitimacy of their statehood itself. 

Even when relations are at their worst, the idea of one nation ceasing to exist is not typically part of the mainstream international discourse or a stated aim of either government (though some extremist elements might hold such views).

Israel: Basis of Formation: 

Israel's formation in 1948 was also rooted in a form of self-determination – that of the Jewish people to establish a national home in their ancestral land, Zionism. 

However, unlike India and Pakistan, it emerged from the British Mandate for Palestine, a territory also claimed by the Arab Palestinian population who also sought self-determination.

International Mandate and UN Resolution: 

Key to Israel's legal argument for its existence are the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine (which explicitly recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people to the land and the grounds for reconstituting their national home), and the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181). The Partition Plan recommended the creation of both a Jewish and an Arab state. While the Jewish leadership accepted the plan, the Arab states and Palestinian leadership rejected it, leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

Contested Legitimacy from Neighboring States: 

Unlike India and Pakistan, Israel's very "right to exist" has been systematically denied by a significant number of its immediate neighbors and some other nations for decades. This denial often stems from the narrative that Israel's creation involved the displacement of Palestinians and the perceived injustice of a Jewish state being established on land also claimed by Arabs. While some Arab states have since recognized Israel (Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco), the foundational challenge to its legitimacy persists from many others and from significant portions of Palestinian society.

"Right to Exist" as a Political Assertion: For Israel, the assertion of its "right to exist" is not just a legal formality but a critical political and security statement. It is a demand for acceptance of its fundamental legitimacy as a sovereign nation-state of the Jewish people, especially in the face of movements and ideologies that seek its dissolution. This makes the "right to exist" a more highly charged and frequently invoked concept in the Israeli context than it is for India or Pakistan.

Key Differences Summarized:

Acceptance by Neighbors: India and Pakistan, despite their conflicts, generally accept each other's statehood. Israel, for many decades, faced fundamental rejection of its existence by a large bloc of its neighbors and the wider Arab/Muslim world.

Narrative of Formation: 

While all three involved complex historical processes and often violent partitions, the narrative surrounding Israel's formation is heavily intertwined with the ongoing Palestinian national aspirations, leading to a direct clash over land and legitimacy that doesn't exist in the same way between India and Pakistan.

Political vs. Legal Emphasis: 

For India and Pakistan, their existence is a given, legally and politically.

For Israel, while legally established and recognized by many, its "right to exist" remains a prominent political assertion due to continuous challenges to its fundamental legitimacy by some actors.

In essence, while the legal framework for statehood (sovereignty, recognition, territorial integrity) applies to all three, the political and historical context of their formation and subsequent relations means that the "notion of an inherent 'right to exist'" plays out very differently. For Israel, it's a constant affirmation against denial, whereas for India and Pakistan, it's an accepted premise, even amidst severe bilateral disputes.

Why did the Arabs of Palestine not proclaim a "Palestinian State" in 1948

 Question: Why did the Arabs of Palestine who lost the war in 1948 not proclaim a "Palestinian State" in the territory left them? The West Bank and Gaza?

This is another critical question that highlights the complex and often tragic turns of Palestinian history after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. While the Arabs of Palestine undoubtedly aspired to self-determination, they did not proclaim a state in the West Bank and Gaza after 1948 for several significant reasons:

Mainly the occupation by neighboring Arab States: The "West Bank" which included the Old City and East Jerusalem was conquered by Transjordan: 

After the 1948 war, Transjordan (which became Jordan in 1949) who had conquered the area, renamed the area as "the West Bank". King Abdullah I had long harbored ambitions to expand his kingdom and integrate the previous Mandated Area. In 1950, Jordan formally annexed the disputed Mandated Areas and renamed it the "West Bank". This annexation was not widely recognized except for the United Kingdom and Pakistan. For nearly two decades (until 1967), the West Bank was administered as part of Jordan. Palestinians living there were granted Jordanian citizenship.

Gaza Strip by Egypt: The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian military administration after the 1948 war. Egypt maintained a military governor in Gaza but did not formally annex the territory. Palestinians in Gaza were not granted Egyptian citizenship and remained largely stateless, although they were allowed to attend Egyptian universities.

Pan-Arabism and the "Greater Arab" Cause:

At the time, the dominant political ideology in the Arab world was Pan-Arabism, which emphasized the unity of all Arab peoples. Many Arab leaders, including those in power in Egypt and Jordan, believed that the ultimate goal was the liberation of all of Palestine and the establishment of a single, unified Arab state, rather than a separate, smaller Palestinian state. Proclaiming a separate Palestinian state in the remaining territories might have been seen as legitimizing the partition and conceding the rest of Palestine to Israel.

The Arab League even attempted to establish an "All-Palestine Government" in Gaza in September 1948, headed by Haj Amin al-Husseini, but this was largely a symbolic entity without real power, seated in Cairo and entirely dependent on Egypt. It was short-lived and ultimately abolished by Nasser in 1959.

Lack of Unified Palestinian Leadership and Institutions:

The Palestinian leadership was fractured and weakened after the 1948 defeat and the displacement of a large portion of the population. Many key leaders went into exile.

There were no strong, independent Palestinian political institutions on the ground in the West Bank or Gaza that could effectively declare and govern a state in defiance of their powerful Arab occupiers.

Focus on the Right of Return and the "Liberation" of all Palestine:

For the vast majority of Palestinians who became refugees, and for the broader Arab world, the immediate focus after 1948 was not on establishing a state in the small remaining fragments of Palestine, but on securing the right of return for the refugees and ultimately "liberating" all of historic Palestine from Israeli control.

Accepting a state in the West Bank and Gaza might have been perceived as abandoning the rights of the refugees and legitimizing Israel's existence on the majority of the land.

External Control and Strategic Interests of Arab States:

Jordan and Egypt, as occupying powers, had their own strategic interests. 

Jordan aimed to consolidate its control over the West Bank, integrating it into its kingdom. 

Egypt found the Gaza Strip to be a burden, but it was strategically important as a buffer zone and a base for Palestinian fedayeen operations. Neither wanted to cede control to a fledgling Palestinian entity that might challenge their authority or draw them into further conflict.

In essence, the Palestinians in 1948-1967 were in a difficult position: their territory was controlled by powerful Arab neighbors who had their own agendas, their leadership was dispersed, and the overriding goal for many was the "liberation" of all of Palestine, not merely the creation of a mini-state in the remnants. It wasn't until after the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, that the idea of a distinct Palestinian state in those territories began to gain significant traction within the Palestinian national movement, largely through the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Judaea and Shomron -International Law and the "Occupied Territories"

As the treaty of Lausance IS international Law, the previous Mandated Area of Judaea and Shomron part of the "future Homeland of the Jewish people" refused by the Arabs of the Mandated Areas and conqured and illegally occupied by the Jordanians -who called the "Disputed territories" the West Bank. 

According to International Law does this area NOT legally belong to Israel?

This is a complex question with deeply contested legal and political interpretations. 

While the Treaty of Lausanne is indeed international law, its direct application to the current status of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank ) is not straightforward and is subject to significant debate among international legal scholars and political actors.

Here's a breakdown of the key arguments and considerations:

1. The Treaty of Lausanne and the Mandate for Palestine:

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) formally ended the war between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire. Crucially, it meant Turkey relinquished all claims to its former territories outside its new borders, including those that would become the British Mandate for Palestine.

The Mandate for Palestine, assigned to Britain by the League of Nations in 1922, explicitly incorporated the Balfour Declaration, which called for the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people" in British Mandated Territory known as "Palestine".

The Mandate recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people to the land and aimed to facilitate Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land.

Proponents of Israel's claim often argue that the Mandate, with its emphasis on a Jewish national home, provided an international legal basis for Jewish self-determination in the territory. 

They contend that the areas west of the Jordan River, including Judea and Samaria, were part of this designated "future Homeland of the Jewish people."

2. The Jordanian Occupation and "Disputed Territories":

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jordan occupied and later annexed the West Bank (which it called the "West Bank"), including East Jerusalem. This annexation was largely not recognized internationally (except by a few states like the UK and Pakistan).

Israel argues that because Jordan's annexation was illegal, the West Bank was not sovereign Jordanian territory when Israel captured it in the 1967 Six-Day War. Therefore, Israel views the territory as "disputed" or "unallocated" rather than "occupied" in the traditional sense of occupying another sovereign state's land.

3. International Law and the "Occupied Territories" Consensus:

The prevailing international legal consensus, supported by the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and most states, regards the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) as occupied Palestinian territory.

This view rests on the principle of "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and other international legal instruments.

The Fourth Geneva Convention, which regulates the conduct of an occupying power, is widely considered applicable to Israel's presence in the West Bank by the international community. 

Article 49(6) of this convention prohibits an occupying power from transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. 

This is the basis for the pro-Arab (Balestinian Point of View) biased international community's view that Israeli "settlements" in the West Bank are illegal.

Recent rulings by the ICJ based SOLELY on the pro-Arab (Balestinian Point of View), including its advisory opinion in July 2024, have reaffirmed the illegality of Israel's "occupation" of the Palestinian territories, its settlement regime, and its policies, stating that they violate international law.

Conclusion:

This framework, while universally applied to other occupations, is selectively and unfairly applied to Israel, effectively ignoring historical Jewish claims and security concerns.

While historical documents like the Treaty of Lausanne and the Mandate for Palestine are part of the complex historical and legal background, the dominant, pro-Arab (Balestinian) Point of  view, in international law regarding the "Disputed Territories" aka the West Bank, is that it is "occupied" territory.

Therefore, according to the prevailing pro-Arab (Balestinian) false narration the interpretation of international law in the international community, the area does not legally belong to Israel in the sense of sovereign annexation. 

Its final status is considered a matter for negotiations between the parties involved, aiming for a resolution that respects the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people but blithely ignores that of the Jews and Israel!

It's important to acknowledge that Israel disputes this pro-Arab (Balestinian) false narration interpretation, by presenting its own legal arguments based on historical claims, security needs, and the lack of a recognized prior sovereign over the territory. 

However, this Israeli position remains a minority view within the international legal framework.

The "prevailing international legal view" tends to emphasize Palestinian self-determination while seemingly downplaying or overlooking the historical and national rights of the Jewish people, which were indeed recognized in earlier international instruments.

Transfer of the Arabs of Judea and Shomron-historical reciprocity

If the Arabs expelled the Jews from Arab countries and by Jordanian Law ALL residents of the previous Jordanian occupied West Bank were made citizens of Jordan. Why should Israel not expell them to Jordan?

This is a very sensitive and complex area, often raised in arguments against Palestinian claims, particularly concerning historical reciprocity and the concept of "transfer" (expulsion). Let's break down the different legal, historical, and ethical dimensions of the question.

1. The Jewish Exodus from Arab Countries:

It is a well-documented historical fact that, following the establishment of Israel in 1948, and often in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict, approximately 850,000 Jews were expelled, fled, or were forced to leave Arab and Muslim-majority countries across the Middle East and North Africa. This was often accompanied by confiscation of property, discrimination, and violence. Most of these Jewish refugees were absorbed by Israel. This historical event is often referred to as the "Jewish Nakba" by some, drawing a parallel to the Palestinian narrative of "displacement".

2. Jordanian Citizenship for West Bank Residents (1948-1988):

After Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950 (an annexation largely unrecognized internationally), it extended Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinian residents of the West Bank. This continued until Jordan officially relinquished its claims to the West Bank in 1988, in favor of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

3. Why Israel Should Not Expel Palestinians to Jordan (from an international law and ethical perspective):

Despite the historical grievances and the points you raise, the overwhelming consensus of international law and most of the international community would strongly condemn and oppose any forced expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan, for several key reasons:

• Prohibition of Forced Displacement/Ethnic Cleansing:

  • International Humanitarian Law (IHL): The Fourth Geneva Convention, which governs belligerent occupation, explicitly prohibits the individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations of protected persons from occupied territory. This is considered a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and a war crime.
  • Customary International Law: The prohibition of forced displacement and ethnic cleansing is considered a fundamental principle of customary international law, binding on all states.
  • Rome Statute: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lists "deportation or forcible transfer of population" as a crime against humanity and a war crime.

• Right to Self-Determination: Palestinians are recognized under international law as a people with the right to self-determination. Forcibly expelling them from their homes and land would directly violate this fundamental right.

• "Terra Nullius" is Rejected: As discussed previously, the West Bank is not terra nullius. It is inhabited territory with a distinct population.

• No Reciprocity in Law: While the historical injustices faced by Jewish communities in Arab countries are undeniable, international law does not operate on a principle of "reciprocal injustice." One wrong (the expulsion of Jews from Arab countries) does not legally justify another wrong (the expulsion of Palestinians). Each action is judged on its own merits under international legal frameworks.

• Humanitarian Catastrophe: Such an act would constitute a massive humanitarian catastrophe, creating millions of new refugees and destabilizing the entire region, leading to widespread international condemnation and potentially severe consequences for Israel.

• Jordan's Position: Jordan has repeatedly stated that it will not accept the mass transfer of Palestinians and views such a move as a threat to its own stability. Jordan already hosts a large Palestinian population, many of whom are citizens, but it distinguishes between its citizens and the residents of the West Bank.

4. The "Transfer" Concept within Israeli Discourse:

While not mainstream government policy, the idea of "transferring" Palestinians (often implicitly to Jordan) has existed as a fringe idea within some segments of Israeli political thought, particularly on the far-right. This concept is overwhelmingly rejected by mainstream Israeli politics and by the international community due to the reasons outlined above.

In summary:

The historical facts you raise (expulsion of Jews from Arab countries and Jordanian citizenship for West Bank residents) are important for understanding the complex historical context and the deep sense of grievance felt by many Israelis. 

However, under current international law and widely accepted ethical norms, these facts do not provide a legal or moral justification for Israel to forcibly expel Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. Such an act would be considered a grave violation of international law, a war crime, and would lead to unprecedented humanitarian and geopolitical consequences.