Islam and Terrorism Facts

 As a historian and fact checker allow me relay some pertinent information to many who are uninformed of truth and facts.

First of all  The world's population is estimated to be over 8.2 billion as of mid-2025. Of this   Muslims make up approximately 24.1% of the global population, totaling an estimated 2 billion people.

As to Arab -Muslim extremism -mainly that which is aimed against Israel-we can readily see that there are many Muslims who do not support "terrorism". In fact, several Muslim-majority countries have established diplomatic relations with Israel, indicating a more moderate stance and a willingness to engage in peace and cooperation. These countries generally fall into two categories: those who signed peace treaties decades ago, and those who have normalized relations more recently through the Abraham Accords.

Countries with Established Peace Treaties:

• Egypt (1979): The first Arab nation to sign a peace treaty with Israel (Camp David Accords). They maintain full diplomatic relations and security cooperation.
• Jordan (1994): Signed a peace treaty with Israel, establishing diplomatic ties and cooperation on various issues, particularly water resources.

Countries that Normalized Relations through the Abraham Accords (starting in 2020): brokered by the United States, marked a significant shift in regional dynamics.

• United Arab Emirates (UAE): Has rapidly developed robust economic, technological, and tourism ties with Israel since normalization.
• Bahrain: Also a Gulf nation, Bahrain has established strong diplomatic and security relations with Israel.
• Morocco: Re-established full diplomatic relations with Israel, building on historical ties between Moroccan Jews and the kingdom.
• Sudan: While Sudan signed a normalization agreement, the process has faced some internal challenges due to political instability.

Other "Notable Mentions":

• Turkey: Though Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel in 1949. Relations have fluctuated over the years but generally maintain a level of diplomatic and economic engagement.
• Azerbaijan: A secular, Muslim-majority country that has long maintained strong strategic and economic ties with Israel, particularly in energy and defense.
• Kosovo: A Muslim-majority country that established diplomatic relations with Israel in 2021.

It's important to note that the term "moderate" can be interpreted differently, and relations between these countries and Israel can still be influenced by regional events, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, these nations have made the strategic decision to normalize or maintain ties with Israel.

The "Terrorism in Islam" phenomenon is not inherent to Islam itself, but rather a dangerous pathology rooted in the manipulation of religious doctrine by a fringe element for clear political and ideological objectives by a small, extremist minority like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, etc., There leaders twist religious texts and concepts to justify violence for political or ideological aims. Here are the major Global Jihadist Networks and their Affiliates:

Al-Qaeda (AQ): Ideology: Founded by Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda seeks to establish a global Islamic caliphate by overthrowing what it perceives as corrupt, Western-backed regimes in Muslim-majority countries and expelling Western influence from the Middle East. They prioritize attacks on the "far enemy" (the United States and its allies) to weaken their support for "near enemy" (local governments). Their ideology is rooted in a radical interpretation of Salafi-jihadism.

Area of Operation: Historically active globally, with core leadership largely diminished but strong affiliates in various regions.

Key Affiliates:

• Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): Yemen-based, known for sophisticated bomb plots targeting aviation.
• Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Operates across North Africa and the Sahel region.
• Al-Shabaab: Somalia-based, seeks to overthrow the Somali government and establish a strict Islamic state.
• Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM): A coalition of Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups primarily active in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger).
• Al-Nusra Front (now Hayat Tahrir al-Sham - HTS): While HTS has somewhat distanced itself from overt Al-Qaeda ties and focused on local governance in Idlib, Syria, its origins are as Al-Qaeda's Syrian branch.

 Islamic State (IS), also known as ISIS/ISIL/Daesh:

Ideology: A successor to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS is even more extreme and brutal. It declared a "caliphate" in parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, demanding allegiance from Muslims worldwide. Its ideology is characterized by extreme takfir (excommunication of other Muslims as infidels), sectarian violence (especially against Shias), and a literalist, apocalyptic interpretation of Islamic texts. They prioritize controlling territory and establishing governance.

Area of Operation: While its territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria has been largely dismantled, it maintains active insurgencies and has a global network of affiliates.

Key Affiliates (Provinces - Wilayats):

• Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK or ISIS-K): Active in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and increasingly targeting Iran and Russia.
• Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP): Dominant in parts of Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, having eclipsed Boko Haram in some areas.
• Islamic State - Sinai Province: Active in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula.
• Other smaller affiliates/cells exist in various countries, including parts of Africa (e.g., Mozambique, Congo), Southeast Asia, and Europe.

Other Notable Groups (some with varying degrees of direct "terrorist" designation depending on the country):

Boko Haram: Nigeria-based, seeks to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria and reject Western education. While historically independent, a faction split off to become ISWAP.

The Taliban: Afghanistan-based. While it now controls Afghanistan and presents itself as a governing authority, it was a designated terrorist group and maintains strong ties with Al-Qaeda. Its ideology is based on a strict and often brutal interpretation of Islamic law.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): The Pakistani Taliban, separate from the Afghan Taliban, aims to overthrow the Pakistani government and impose its version of Sharia law.

Hamas: A Palestinian Sunni-Islamist fundamentalist organization. It has both a political wing and an armed wing (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades). Its stated goal is the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic state. It is designated as a terrorist organization by many Western countries.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): Another Palestinian Islamist militant group, even more hardline than Hamas, also committed to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine. It is also widely designated as a terrorist organization.

Hezbollah: A Lebanese Shia Islamist political party and militant group. It is heavily backed by Iran. While it operates as a political party in Lebanon, its armed wing is designated as a terrorist organization by many countries due to its history of attacks and ongoing involvement in regional conflicts.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG): Philippines-based, a smaller, more fractured group with factions that have pledged allegiance to ISIS, known for kidnappings, bombings, and extortions in the southern Philippines.

It is worthwhile to note that the primary victims of "Islamist" terrorism are often other Muslims as has been seen in the bloody civil war in Syria and Iraq. These groups frequently target civilians in Muslim-majority countries, killing far more Muslims than non-Muslims, further underscoring their deviance from mainstream Islamic values.

Extreme Interpretation of Religious Texts (Quran and Hadith) by certain Imans contribute to their behavior as they utilize selective and decontextualized Readings.

Extremists often isolate specific verses (e.g., the "sword verses") from the Quran, ignoring the historical context of their revelation or other verses that promote peace, justice, and proportionality.  Extremists have redefined the term "jihad" as a perpetual, offensive holy war against anyone they deem an "enemy of Islam," including other Muslims who disagree with them. They claim it is an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) for every Muslim, bypassing legitimate religious or political authority, and use it to justify indiscriminate violence, including suicide bombings. 

Abrogation (Naskh): Some extremist interpretations claim that later "more militant" verses abrogate or override earlier, more peaceful ones, justifying offensive warfare. Mainstream Islamic scholarship largely rejects this broad application of abrogation.

Misinterpretation of Jihad: The concept of "jihad" (which literally means "struggle" or "exertion") is central. While mainstream Islam emphasizes the "greater jihad" as an internal spiritual struggle against sin and the "lesser jihad" as defensive warfare, extremists reinterpret it as a perpetual, offensive holy war against non-believers and "apostate" Muslims. They often claim it's an individual obligation (fard ayn) for all Muslims, rather than a collective one (fard kifaya) to be waged under legitimate authority.

Takfir (Excommunication):

This is the practice of declaring other Muslims as kafirs (disbelievers or infidels). Extremist groups use takfir to justify violence against those they deem not "true" Muslims, including mainstream Muslims, government officials, or even entire societies who do not adhere to their rigid interpretation of Islam. This act of excommunication then allows them to justify killing those Muslims, arguing they are no longer part of the Ummah (global Muslim community) and have forfeited their right to life under Islamic law. Thereby denying them the protections typically afforded within Islamic law.

The establishment of a Caliphate/Islamic State:

Many extremist groups believe in the necessity of establishing a global Islamic caliphate or a strict Islamic state governed by their interpretation of Sharia law. They see the current political order as illegitimate and strive to overthrow it through violent means.

Anti-Western and Anti-Modern Sentiments:

These groups often reject Western influence, democracy, and secularism, viewing them as corrupting forces against true Islam. They advocate for a return to what they perceive as the "pure" early Islamic society.

They often use grievances related to perceived Western aggression, occupation of Muslim lands, or support for "apostate" regimes to recruit and justify their actions.

Exclusivism and Intolerance:

Extremist ideologies are characterized by an intolerant and exclusivist worldview, believing that only their specific interpretation of Islam is correct and that all others are misguided or enemies of God. This can lead to hatred and violence against religious minorities, other Muslim sects, and anyone who doesn't conform to their narrow view.

Martyrdom (shahada-Istishhad):

Martyrdom (shahada) is highly revered in Islam, typically referring to dying while defending one's faith or community, or in pursuit of justice, often through conventional warfare or unjust persecution.

Extremist groups manipulate and glorify "martyrdom operations" (suicide attacks), promising immense rewards in the afterlife for those who die while committing acts of violence in their cause. This incentive plays a significant role in motivating individuals to carry out terrorist acts.

While extremists cloister their violence in religious rhetoric, their underlying motivations are often deeply political and ideological.

Establishment of a Global Caliphate/Islamic State: 

A primary goal for groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda is to overthrow existing governments (both Muslim and non-Muslim) and establish a global caliphate governed by their specific, rigid, and often brutal interpretation of Sharia law.

"Resistance" to Perceived Western Influence: 

Many groups are fueled by a narrative of resisting Western "aggression," "occupation," or "cultural imperialism" in Muslim lands. They exploit legitimate grievances (e.g., foreign policy issues, historical injustices) to recruit and justify their violence as a form of liberation or defense.

Overthrowing "Apostate" Regimes: 

They often target Muslim governments and leaders whom they deem illegitimate or "apostate" for not adhering to their extremist version of Islam, or for being allied with Western powers.

Socio-Political Discontent: Extremist ideologies can tap into feelings of marginalization, injustice, poverty, and lack of opportunity, especially among disenfranchised youth, offering a distorted sense of purpose, belonging, and power.

Power and Control:

 Ultimately, these groups seek to establish and wield power, imposing their will through fear and violence, rather than through religious devotion alone.

Israeli Aircraft

To all the "Armchair generals" "But I know it alls" allow me to provide facts.

We do NOT require a "B-52" an aircraft originally designed in the early 1950's! Nor an overly expensive B-2.

As in the past we have seen how our own Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) has a rich history of designing and producing superior military aircraft, thereby playing a crucial role in Israel's defense.

IAI is world particularly renowned for it's revolutionary production of "UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) and improvements on American produced aircraft like the F-15I and F-35I.

While  Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) have also produced civilian aircraft and converted various types for cargo, their contributions to military aircraft upgrades are particularly notable.

Here are some of the key military aircraft designed and built by IAI over the years:

IAI Nesher: This was IAI's first fighter jet, essentially a reverse-engineered and improved version of the French Dassault Mirage 5, after France imposed an arms embargo on Israel. It was introduced in 1971.

IAI Kfir: Building on the Nesher, the Kfir (Lion Cub) was a more advanced multi-role fighter, incorporating a stronger American J79 engine and canards for improved maneuverability. It entered service in 1975 and has been exported to several countries. Various variants exist, including the C.1, C.2, C.7, and two-seat trainers (TC.2, TC.7). Some were even leased to the US Navy and Marine Corps as aggressor aircraft (F-21A Lion).

IAI Lavi: This was an ambitious project for a highly advanced, lightweight, single-engine multi-role fighter. It was intended to replace aircraft like the A-4 Skyhawk and Kfir in IAF service. The Lavi featured cutting-edge avionics, ELBIT electronocs, a digital fly-by-wire system, and extensive use of composite materials. 

Although two prototypes flew, the project was ultimately canceled in 1987 due to significant development costs and political pressure, particularly from the United States, which preferred Israel to purchase American-made aircraft like the F-16. 

Despite its cancellation, the Lavi program significantly advanced Israel's aerospace industry and its technologies found their way into other Israeli defense systems.

IAI Arava: This was a short take-off and landing (STOL) transport aircraft, designed for both military and civilian use. The military version was used for light transport and surveillance.

IAI Tzukit (Fouga CM.170 Magister): While originally a French design, IAI undertook licensed manufacturing of this twin-jet trainer, which became the primary trainer for the Israeli Air Force for decades. It also saw combat use as a close-support aircraft during the Six-Day War.

Beyond these fully designed aircraft, IAI is also a major player in: UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles): 

IAI has been a pioneer and global leader in drone technology, with a wide range of UAVs for reconnaissance, surveillance, and even strike capabilities. Notable examples include the Scout, Searcher, Heron (including Heron 1 and Heron TP), Harpy, and Harop.

Aircraft Upgrades and Conversions: IAI has extensive experience in upgrading and modernizing various military aircraft, often developing sophisticated avionics, electronic warfare systems, and structural modifications for both Israeli and foreign air forces. They also convert passenger aircraft into cargo aircraft for military and civilian clients.

Missile and Defense Systems Integration: IAI is heavily involved in integrating complex missile and defense systems onto various platforms, including their own and foreign-built aircraft.

It is most certainly plausabile that the IAI together with Elbit can produce a suitable UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) to carry a "Massive Ordinance Device" MOD. 

The making of a UAV capable of carrying the weight of an MOD is not to "far farfetched" take for example the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Heron TP / Eitan (Israel) which is in use today: This large MALE UAV is reported to have a very high payload capacity, with some sources indicating up to 2,700 kg (5,950 lb). It can carry multiple mission systems, including radar, intelligence sensors, and combat payloads.

There is also the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper (USA): This is one of the most well-known military UAVs. It has a significant payload capacity, capable of carrying 1,746 kg (3,850 lb), which includes 1,361 kg (3,000 lb) of external stores (weapons, sensors, etc.). It can be armed with Hellfire missiles, guided bombs, and other munitions.

The use of a manned device like the B-1 and B-2 has proven to the US Military to be costly not only in operating (flight) cost but seriosly and massively expensive in upkeep.

Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) and Israel

 More information / facts-(So you will know and understand)

First it should be stated Part of the need for the US Airforce B-2’s is that it could penetrate very deeply into Iranian airspace and strike its targets without having to execute a full air war.

It would still need major support, but, combined with standoff capabilities and stealth tactical jets, it provides an avenue to a quicker and hopefully cleaner conflict aimed at dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

The need for the B-2’s stealth qualities is drastically reduced now that Israel has declared air superiority over Iran. That doesn’t mean ground-based air defenses are not still a threat — especially road mobile, shoulder-fired, and non-traditional systems — but Iran’s overall counter-air capability has been severely degraded. Fighters and even slow-moving large drones that operate at medium altitude are now flying relatively freely over major Iranian population centers today.

It is now plausable that an Israeli Airforce C-130 "Hercules" can survive reliably deep into Iranian territory now that the IAF basically control the skies over Iran.
Therefore it would be relevant for going after those nuclear targets that standard aerial weaponry cannot reach.

The GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) could be designed to maximize the C-130’s airdrop envelope and not exceed it, and should have no problem fitting inside of and being released by a C-130.
Dropping a weapon weighing nearly 30,000 pounds out the back of a C-130 would certainly be something to behold.

One major area where the C-130 would be at a disadvantage to the B-2, beyond its survivability and ability to carry two MOPs at once, is its speed and altitude. The Hercules flies substantially lower and slower than the B-2, which would have an impact on the weapon’s overall impact force, and likely substantially so. A C-130 dropping the same weapon at 25,000 feet and 250 miles per hour will result in significantly less kinetic force of impact than a B-2 dropping the weapon at 50,000 feet and 500 miles per hour. This is a big deal for a munition that is meant to burrow down as deeply as possible into a mountain and detonate.
It isn’t clear if these performance differences would separate success from failure. It may be that just additional munitions would be needed in order to burrow down one on top of the other deeper into the mountain to hit the targeted cavity.

The GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) is a precision-guided "bunker buster" bomb primarily comprised of:

BLU-127 Bomb Body (Warhead/Penetrator Case): This is the core of the weapon, designed to penetrate deeply buried and hardened targets.
Explosive Fill: The BLU-127 bomb body contains a significant amount of high-performance polymer-bonded explosives, typically a combination of AFX-757 and PBXN-114. This explosive is optimized for controlled detonation after penetration.

Casing: The bomb's casing is made from a high-density Eglin steel alloy, specifically engineered to withstand the extreme stresses of deep penetration before detonation.

Guidance Kit: This provides the precision guidance for the bomb.
Global Positioning System (GPS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS): These systems work together to ensure accurate targeting, allowing the bomb to strike within meters of its intended target.

Grid Fins: These retractable fins help stabilize the bomb in flight and allow for mid-course adjustments to maintain its trajectory.

Large Penetrator Smart Fuze (LPSF): This advanced fuzing system manages the detonation timing, adjusting the moment of explosion based on impact depth and the characteristics of the underground structure.

In essence, the GBU-57 is a combination of a robust, penetrating bomb body with a powerful explosive fill, integrated with a sophisticated guidance and fuzing system for precision and optimized detonation.

Palestinian Unity and the Nachba

 After seeing countless social media posts; by the Haters of Israel Zionism and Jews -specifically those graduates of the Communist / Socialist Antifa Shahid (Martys) school for imbeciles and those fellow self-hating Jews (in Name Only) who rant and rave like the lunatics they are that the "Zionist aggression" started "70 years ago" when the "All powerful" (read American and USSR supplied and armed) Hagannah , Palmach and vilified Irgun and LECHI led to the "Great Nachba".

Those who speak of Arab "Palestinian Unity" fail to note that even before the creation of the Jewish State the competing Arab leaders; the Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini and exiled Iraqi former Prime Minister Rashid Ali had desired to divide the land between themselves and had established "armed militias" to achieve their goals.

Now for the WHOLE truth -

Iraqi former Prime Minister Rashid Ali had created the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji while the Grand Mufti had created the Army of the Holy War led by his kinsman Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni.
In addition to these two "militias", who vied for the former British Mandates Areas, where the armies of the Arab League who also vied for the conquest of the "Mandated Areas" to divide the land betwen themselves.

Abdul Qadir al-Husayni was born to the prominent and influential al-Husayni family of Jerusalem.
Abdul Qadir completed his secondary education in Jerusalem with distinction and then started at the College of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut, but did not continue his studies there. Instead, he went to and later graduated in chemistry at the American University in Cairo while organising the Congress of Educated Muslims.

Initially, he took a post in the settlement department of the British Mandate government but eventually moved to the Hebron area during the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine to lead the struggle against the British where he was a guerilla commander for the Jerusalem district in the summer 1936.
In 1938, Abdul Qadir was exiled and in 1939 moved to Iraq where he took part in the Golden Square coup d'état. He moved to Egypt in 1946, but surreptitiously returned to Palestine to lead the Army of the Holy War in January 1948.

Husayni was killed while personally reconnoitring an area of Qastal Hill shrouded by fog, in the early hours of 8 April 1948.

His forces later captured al-Qastal from the Haganah, which retreated to the Jewish settlement of Motza.
Palmach troops recaptured the village on the night of 8–9 April, losing 18 men in the attack; and the hill became a command post.

Husayni's death has been regarded as THE major factor for the loss of morale among his forces.

Fawzi al-Qawuqji was a Lebanese-born Arab nationalist who served as a colonel in the Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II, and commanded the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) during the 1948 Palestine War.

After the UN Partition vote, the Arab League appointed Fawzi al-Qawuqji to be field commander of the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) in the 1948 Palestine War. This appointment was opposed by Haj Amin Husseini, who had appointed his own kinsman Abdul Qadir al-Husseini as the commander of the Army of the Holy War.
The execution of the 1948 Palestine War was marked by the personal, family, and political rivalry between al-Qawuqji (who fought mainly in northern Palestine) and al-Husayni, who fought mostly in the Jerusalem area.

It cries out to be noted that in early March 1948, al-Qawuqji moved some of his forces from the Damascus area and crossed - unmolested by British troops- into the Mandated Area of Palestine over the Allenby Bridge on March 6 and 7, leading hundreds of Arab and Bosnian volunteers in a column of twenty-five trucks.
The British troops' inaction infuriated General Sir Gordon MacMillan, who stated that al-Qawuqji should not be allowed "to go openly rampaging over territory in which Britain considered herself a sovereign power." General MacMillan did not want to confront al-Qawuqji's force, since he cowardly saw "no point in getting a lot of British soldiers killed in that kind of operation."

Inside Mandatory Palestine, al-Qawuqji commanded a few thousand armed men who had infiltrated the area deom neighboring Arab countries. They were grouped into several regiments concentrated in Galilee and around Nablus.
According to Collins and Lapierre, Al-Qawuqji told his troops that the purpose was "ridding Palestine of the Zionist plague", and his aim was "to drive all the Jews into the sea."

On the 4th of April 1948, the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) mounted a major attack on the kibbutz Mishmar HaEmek which sat near the strategic road that connected Haifa to Jenin, and was surrounded by Arab villages.
In the attack al-Qawuqji initiated the first use of artillery during the war by directing his seven 75 and 105 mm field guns to fire on the kibbutz for a 36-hour barrage. During this battle al-Qawuqji issued a number of announcements that were subsequently proven false.
In the first 24-hours he announced victory, on April 8th he announced he had taken Mishmar HaEmek.

However after the battle was lost he claimed the Jews had been assisted by non-Jewish Soviet troops and bombers. As "Proof" al-Qawuqji claimed to have intercepted copies telegrams, but these mendaciously false "telegrams of proof" can be seen preserved in the Jordanian archives.

The Haganah and Palmach counter-attacked and the ALA were routed. The battle was over by 16 April, and most of the Arabs in the area fled, disheartened by the defeat of the ALA or demoralized by the Jewish victory. The remaining minority were expelled from the surrounding Arab villages by Jewish forces.

In July, al-Qawuqji launched a rolling offensive of counterattacks, focusing on Ilaniya (Sejera), a Jewish settlement deep in ALA territory. Although he deployed armored cars and a battery of 75 mm artillery the opposing Golani Twelfth Battalion withstood the attack, inflicting heavy losses on the ALA. The battle ended on 18 July, with the ALA losing the Arab village of Lubiya, which had been their main base in Central Eastern Galilee.

The ALA established control of upper central Galilee, from the Sakhnin–Arabe–Deir Hanna line through Majd al-Krum up to the Lebanese border until October 1948. On 22 October, the date of the third UN Security Council cease-fire order, the ALA attacked Sheikh Abd, a hilltop overlooking Kibbutz Manara and put the kibbutz under siege.

In conclusion The REAL TRUTH, in THEIR OWN WORDS, of WHY the "Arab inhabitants of the Mandated Area of Palestine" FLED!

In the memoirs of Haled al Azm, who served as Prime Minister of Syria in 1948 and 1949, that were published in Beirut in 1973. Azm admitted in his memoirs that it was actually the Arab governments who called for the palestinian Arabs to evacuate and leave by sowing terror in them.

"Five: the call by the Arab governments to the inhabitants of Palestine to evacuate it and to leave for the bordering Arab countries after sowing the terror among them, following the incident at Deir Yassin."

"Since 1948 we have been demanding the return of the refugees to their homes. But we ourselves are the ones who encouraged them to leave."

Note the closing paragraph from his memoirs:

"We have brought destruction upon a (sic) million Arab refugees by calling upon them and pleading with them to leave their land, their homes, their work and business, and we have caused them to be barren and unemployed...we accustomed them to begging for handouts and to suffice with what little the UN organization would allocate them."

The notion of an inherent "right to exist" in regards to Pakistan, India, and Israel

Pakistan is a Moslem country and India is a primary Hindu nation how is their the notion of an inherent "right to exist" different from that regarding Israel?

While the concept of a state's "right to exist" isn't explicitly codified in international law as a standalone right for any state, the circumstances of their formation and the subsequent international acceptance lead to different political and legal realities concerning their existence.

Here's how the situations of Pakistan, India, and Israel differ in terms of the "notion of an inherent right to exist":

India and Pakistan: Basis of Formation: 

India and Pakistan were formed in 1947 through the partition of British India upon its independence. 

This was a direct result of British colonial policy and the culmination of decades of independence movements, particularly the demand for a separate Muslim homeland (Pakistan) due to fears of Hindu majority dominance in a united India.

Self-Determination of Existing Communities: 

Their formation was largely seen as an act of self-determination for the Hindu-majority population of India and the Muslim-majority population of Pakistan (though with massive displacement and violence). 

The legitimacy of their existence stems from this decolonization process and the immediate, widespread international recognition as sovereign states.

Lack of Fundamental Challenge to Existence: 

While India and Pakistan have a deeply contentious relationship, marked by wars and ongoing disputes (especially over Kashmir), the fundamental right of either state to exist is generally not questioned by the international community as a whole. 

Their borders and sovereignty are recognized, and disputes revolve around territory and specific policies, not the legitimacy of their statehood itself. 

Even when relations are at their worst, the idea of one nation ceasing to exist is not typically part of the mainstream international discourse or a stated aim of either government (though some extremist elements might hold such views).

Israel: Basis of Formation: 

Israel's formation in 1948 was also rooted in a form of self-determination – that of the Jewish people to establish a national home in their ancestral land, Zionism. 

However, unlike India and Pakistan, it emerged from the British Mandate for Palestine, a territory also claimed by the Arab Palestinian population who also sought self-determination.

International Mandate and UN Resolution: 

Key to Israel's legal argument for its existence are the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine (which explicitly recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people to the land and the grounds for reconstituting their national home), and the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181). The Partition Plan recommended the creation of both a Jewish and an Arab state. While the Jewish leadership accepted the plan, the Arab states and Palestinian leadership rejected it, leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

Contested Legitimacy from Neighboring States: 

Unlike India and Pakistan, Israel's very "right to exist" has been systematically denied by a significant number of its immediate neighbors and some other nations for decades. This denial often stems from the narrative that Israel's creation involved the displacement of Palestinians and the perceived injustice of a Jewish state being established on land also claimed by Arabs. While some Arab states have since recognized Israel (Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco), the foundational challenge to its legitimacy persists from many others and from significant portions of Palestinian society.

"Right to Exist" as a Political Assertion: For Israel, the assertion of its "right to exist" is not just a legal formality but a critical political and security statement. It is a demand for acceptance of its fundamental legitimacy as a sovereign nation-state of the Jewish people, especially in the face of movements and ideologies that seek its dissolution. This makes the "right to exist" a more highly charged and frequently invoked concept in the Israeli context than it is for India or Pakistan.

Key Differences Summarized:

Acceptance by Neighbors: India and Pakistan, despite their conflicts, generally accept each other's statehood. Israel, for many decades, faced fundamental rejection of its existence by a large bloc of its neighbors and the wider Arab/Muslim world.

Narrative of Formation: 

While all three involved complex historical processes and often violent partitions, the narrative surrounding Israel's formation is heavily intertwined with the ongoing Palestinian national aspirations, leading to a direct clash over land and legitimacy that doesn't exist in the same way between India and Pakistan.

Political vs. Legal Emphasis: 

For India and Pakistan, their existence is a given, legally and politically.

For Israel, while legally established and recognized by many, its "right to exist" remains a prominent political assertion due to continuous challenges to its fundamental legitimacy by some actors.

In essence, while the legal framework for statehood (sovereignty, recognition, territorial integrity) applies to all three, the political and historical context of their formation and subsequent relations means that the "notion of an inherent 'right to exist'" plays out very differently. For Israel, it's a constant affirmation against denial, whereas for India and Pakistan, it's an accepted premise, even amidst severe bilateral disputes.

Why did the Arabs of Palestine not proclaim a "Palestinian State" in 1948

 Question: Why did the Arabs of Palestine who lost the war in 1948 not proclaim a "Palestinian State" in the territory left them? The West Bank and Gaza?

This is another critical question that highlights the complex and often tragic turns of Palestinian history after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. While the Arabs of Palestine undoubtedly aspired to self-determination, they did not proclaim a state in the West Bank and Gaza after 1948 for several significant reasons:

Mainly the occupation by neighboring Arab States: The "West Bank" which included the Old City and East Jerusalem was conquered by Transjordan: 

After the 1948 war, Transjordan (which became Jordan in 1949) who had conquered the area, renamed the area as "the West Bank". King Abdullah I had long harbored ambitions to expand his kingdom and integrate the previous Mandated Area. In 1950, Jordan formally annexed the disputed Mandated Areas and renamed it the "West Bank". This annexation was not widely recognized except for the United Kingdom and Pakistan. For nearly two decades (until 1967), the West Bank was administered as part of Jordan. Palestinians living there were granted Jordanian citizenship.

Gaza Strip by Egypt: The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian military administration after the 1948 war. Egypt maintained a military governor in Gaza but did not formally annex the territory. Palestinians in Gaza were not granted Egyptian citizenship and remained largely stateless, although they were allowed to attend Egyptian universities.

Pan-Arabism and the "Greater Arab" Cause:

At the time, the dominant political ideology in the Arab world was Pan-Arabism, which emphasized the unity of all Arab peoples. Many Arab leaders, including those in power in Egypt and Jordan, believed that the ultimate goal was the liberation of all of Palestine and the establishment of a single, unified Arab state, rather than a separate, smaller Palestinian state. Proclaiming a separate Palestinian state in the remaining territories might have been seen as legitimizing the partition and conceding the rest of Palestine to Israel.

The Arab League even attempted to establish an "All-Palestine Government" in Gaza in September 1948, headed by Haj Amin al-Husseini, but this was largely a symbolic entity without real power, seated in Cairo and entirely dependent on Egypt. It was short-lived and ultimately abolished by Nasser in 1959.

Lack of Unified Palestinian Leadership and Institutions:

The Palestinian leadership was fractured and weakened after the 1948 defeat and the displacement of a large portion of the population. Many key leaders went into exile.

There were no strong, independent Palestinian political institutions on the ground in the West Bank or Gaza that could effectively declare and govern a state in defiance of their powerful Arab occupiers.

Focus on the Right of Return and the "Liberation" of all Palestine:

For the vast majority of Palestinians who became refugees, and for the broader Arab world, the immediate focus after 1948 was not on establishing a state in the small remaining fragments of Palestine, but on securing the right of return for the refugees and ultimately "liberating" all of historic Palestine from Israeli control.

Accepting a state in the West Bank and Gaza might have been perceived as abandoning the rights of the refugees and legitimizing Israel's existence on the majority of the land.

External Control and Strategic Interests of Arab States:

Jordan and Egypt, as occupying powers, had their own strategic interests. 

Jordan aimed to consolidate its control over the West Bank, integrating it into its kingdom. 

Egypt found the Gaza Strip to be a burden, but it was strategically important as a buffer zone and a base for Palestinian fedayeen operations. Neither wanted to cede control to a fledgling Palestinian entity that might challenge their authority or draw them into further conflict.

In essence, the Palestinians in 1948-1967 were in a difficult position: their territory was controlled by powerful Arab neighbors who had their own agendas, their leadership was dispersed, and the overriding goal for many was the "liberation" of all of Palestine, not merely the creation of a mini-state in the remnants. It wasn't until after the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, that the idea of a distinct Palestinian state in those territories began to gain significant traction within the Palestinian national movement, largely through the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Judaea and Shomron -International Law and the "Occupied Territories"

As the treaty of Lausance IS international Law, the previous Mandated Area of Judaea and Shomron part of the "future Homeland of the Jewish people" refused by the Arabs of the Mandated Areas and conqured and illegally occupied by the Jordanians -who called the "Disputed territories" the West Bank. 

According to International Law does this area NOT legally belong to Israel?

This is a complex question with deeply contested legal and political interpretations. 

While the Treaty of Lausanne is indeed international law, its direct application to the current status of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank ) is not straightforward and is subject to significant debate among international legal scholars and political actors.

Here's a breakdown of the key arguments and considerations:

1. The Treaty of Lausanne and the Mandate for Palestine:

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) formally ended the war between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire. Crucially, it meant Turkey relinquished all claims to its former territories outside its new borders, including those that would become the British Mandate for Palestine.

The Mandate for Palestine, assigned to Britain by the League of Nations in 1922, explicitly incorporated the Balfour Declaration, which called for the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people" in British Mandated Territory known as "Palestine".

The Mandate recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people to the land and aimed to facilitate Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land.

Proponents of Israel's claim often argue that the Mandate, with its emphasis on a Jewish national home, provided an international legal basis for Jewish self-determination in the territory. 

They contend that the areas west of the Jordan River, including Judea and Samaria, were part of this designated "future Homeland of the Jewish people."

2. The Jordanian Occupation and "Disputed Territories":

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jordan occupied and later annexed the West Bank (which it called the "West Bank"), including East Jerusalem. This annexation was largely not recognized internationally (except by a few states like the UK and Pakistan).

Israel argues that because Jordan's annexation was illegal, the West Bank was not sovereign Jordanian territory when Israel captured it in the 1967 Six-Day War. Therefore, Israel views the territory as "disputed" or "unallocated" rather than "occupied" in the traditional sense of occupying another sovereign state's land.

3. International Law and the "Occupied Territories" Consensus:

The prevailing international legal consensus, supported by the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and most states, regards the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) as occupied Palestinian territory.

This view rests on the principle of "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and other international legal instruments.

The Fourth Geneva Convention, which regulates the conduct of an occupying power, is widely considered applicable to Israel's presence in the West Bank by the international community. 

Article 49(6) of this convention prohibits an occupying power from transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. 

This is the basis for the pro-Arab (Balestinian Point of View) biased international community's view that Israeli "settlements" in the West Bank are illegal.

Recent rulings by the ICJ based SOLELY on the pro-Arab (Balestinian Point of View), including its advisory opinion in July 2024, have reaffirmed the illegality of Israel's "occupation" of the Palestinian territories, its settlement regime, and its policies, stating that they violate international law.

Conclusion:

This framework, while universally applied to other occupations, is selectively and unfairly applied to Israel, effectively ignoring historical Jewish claims and security concerns.

While historical documents like the Treaty of Lausanne and the Mandate for Palestine are part of the complex historical and legal background, the dominant, pro-Arab (Balestinian) Point of  view, in international law regarding the "Disputed Territories" aka the West Bank, is that it is "occupied" territory.

Therefore, according to the prevailing pro-Arab (Balestinian) false narration the interpretation of international law in the international community, the area does not legally belong to Israel in the sense of sovereign annexation. 

Its final status is considered a matter for negotiations between the parties involved, aiming for a resolution that respects the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people but blithely ignores that of the Jews and Israel!

It's important to acknowledge that Israel disputes this pro-Arab (Balestinian) false narration interpretation, by presenting its own legal arguments based on historical claims, security needs, and the lack of a recognized prior sovereign over the territory. 

However, this Israeli position remains a minority view within the international legal framework.

The "prevailing international legal view" tends to emphasize Palestinian self-determination while seemingly downplaying or overlooking the historical and national rights of the Jewish people, which were indeed recognized in earlier international instruments.

Transfer of the Arabs of Judea and Shomron-historical reciprocity

If the Arabs expelled the Jews from Arab countries and by Jordanian Law ALL residents of the previous Jordanian occupied West Bank were made citizens of Jordan. Why should Israel not expell them to Jordan?

This is a very sensitive and complex area, often raised in arguments against Palestinian claims, particularly concerning historical reciprocity and the concept of "transfer" (expulsion). Let's break down the different legal, historical, and ethical dimensions of the question.

1. The Jewish Exodus from Arab Countries:

It is a well-documented historical fact that, following the establishment of Israel in 1948, and often in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict, approximately 850,000 Jews were expelled, fled, or were forced to leave Arab and Muslim-majority countries across the Middle East and North Africa. This was often accompanied by confiscation of property, discrimination, and violence. Most of these Jewish refugees were absorbed by Israel. This historical event is often referred to as the "Jewish Nakba" by some, drawing a parallel to the Palestinian narrative of "displacement".

2. Jordanian Citizenship for West Bank Residents (1948-1988):

After Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950 (an annexation largely unrecognized internationally), it extended Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinian residents of the West Bank. This continued until Jordan officially relinquished its claims to the West Bank in 1988, in favor of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

3. Why Israel Should Not Expel Palestinians to Jordan (from an international law and ethical perspective):

Despite the historical grievances and the points you raise, the overwhelming consensus of international law and most of the international community would strongly condemn and oppose any forced expulsion of Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan, for several key reasons:

• Prohibition of Forced Displacement/Ethnic Cleansing:

  • International Humanitarian Law (IHL): The Fourth Geneva Convention, which governs belligerent occupation, explicitly prohibits the individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations of protected persons from occupied territory. This is considered a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and a war crime.
  • Customary International Law: The prohibition of forced displacement and ethnic cleansing is considered a fundamental principle of customary international law, binding on all states.
  • Rome Statute: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lists "deportation or forcible transfer of population" as a crime against humanity and a war crime.

• Right to Self-Determination: Palestinians are recognized under international law as a people with the right to self-determination. Forcibly expelling them from their homes and land would directly violate this fundamental right.

• "Terra Nullius" is Rejected: As discussed previously, the West Bank is not terra nullius. It is inhabited territory with a distinct population.

• No Reciprocity in Law: While the historical injustices faced by Jewish communities in Arab countries are undeniable, international law does not operate on a principle of "reciprocal injustice." One wrong (the expulsion of Jews from Arab countries) does not legally justify another wrong (the expulsion of Palestinians). Each action is judged on its own merits under international legal frameworks.

• Humanitarian Catastrophe: Such an act would constitute a massive humanitarian catastrophe, creating millions of new refugees and destabilizing the entire region, leading to widespread international condemnation and potentially severe consequences for Israel.

• Jordan's Position: Jordan has repeatedly stated that it will not accept the mass transfer of Palestinians and views such a move as a threat to its own stability. Jordan already hosts a large Palestinian population, many of whom are citizens, but it distinguishes between its citizens and the residents of the West Bank.

4. The "Transfer" Concept within Israeli Discourse:

While not mainstream government policy, the idea of "transferring" Palestinians (often implicitly to Jordan) has existed as a fringe idea within some segments of Israeli political thought, particularly on the far-right. This concept is overwhelmingly rejected by mainstream Israeli politics and by the international community due to the reasons outlined above.

In summary:

The historical facts you raise (expulsion of Jews from Arab countries and Jordanian citizenship for West Bank residents) are important for understanding the complex historical context and the deep sense of grievance felt by many Israelis. 

However, under current international law and widely accepted ethical norms, these facts do not provide a legal or moral justification for Israel to forcibly expel Palestinians from the West Bank to Jordan. Such an act would be considered a grave violation of international law, a war crime, and would lead to unprecedented humanitarian and geopolitical consequences.

Why should Israel give in to the demands of the Palestinians?

 As the Palestinians refused the partition and have attacked Israel many times why should Israel give in to the demands of the Palestinians?

Key historical points that are indeed central to the Israeli perspective and objections to Palestinian demands: the Palestinian refusal of the 1947 UN Partition Plan and the history of Arab aggression against Israel. 

These are crucial elements in understanding why many Israelis feel that concessions are unwarranted or even dangerous.

From Israel's perspective, the narrative often emphasizes:

• Rejection of the Partition Plan: The 1947 UN Partition Plan offered a two-state solution, with both an Arab and a Jewish state. Israel accepted it, but the Arab leadership and surrounding Arab states rejected it, leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. From this viewpoint, the Palestinians (and the Arab world) missed an opportunity for statehood and initiated a conflict aimed at preventing the existence of a Jewish state.
• Wars of Aggression: Israel views subsequent wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973) as instances of Arab aggression aimed at its destruction. In 1967, Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in what it sees as a defensive war.
• Security Concerns: Given the history of attacks, including terrorism and rocket fire, Israel prioritizes its security. Conceding territory, especially strategic high ground in the West Bank, is seen by many as a direct threat to Israeli security. They argue that a Palestinian state, if not adequately demilitarized and secured, could become a base for further attacks.
• Unreliability of Palestinian Leadership: Some Israelis view Palestinian leadership as unwilling or unable to genuinely commit to peace, citing continued incitement, rejection of past peace proposals, and the internal divisions between factions like Fatah and Hamas.
• Historical and Religious Connection to the Land: For many Israelis, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) are the historical heartland of the Jewish people, with deep religious and historical significance. Giving up these areas is seen as relinquishing an integral part of their heritage.

Why, despite these points, arguments are still made for Israel to make concessions:

While the points outlined above are valid and deeply held by many Israelis, proponents of concessions argue that they are necessary for different reasons, focusing on the future rather than solely on past grievances:

1. Ending the Occupation and Preserving Democracy: As mentioned, maintaining control over a large Palestinian population without granting them full rights threatens Israel's identity as a democratic state with a Jewish majority. A two-state solution, achieved through territorial concessions, is seen as the only way to resolve this demographic dilemma and preserve Israeli democracy.
2. Long-Term Security: While seemingly counterintuitive, many argue that continued occupation is itself a source of instability and insecurity. The ongoing resentment, frustration, and lack of a political horizon among Palestinians fuel extremism and violence. A negotiated peace, leading to a viable Palestinian state, is seen by many security experts as the best long-term security guarantee for Israel, even if it involves difficult concessions.
3. International Legitimacy and Standing: The international community overwhelmingly views the West Bank as occupied territory and settlements as illegal. Continued control without a clear path to statehood for Palestinians leads to international isolation, diplomatic pressure, and legal challenges (e.g., at the International Criminal Court). Concessions would bring Israel closer to international norms and improve its global standing.
4. Moral and Ethical Considerations: Many within Israel and abroad argue that continued occupation and the associated limitations on Palestinian life raise significant moral and ethical questions. Concessions could be seen as upholding universal human rights and principles of justice.
5. Avoiding a One-State Reality: If a two-state solution becomes impossible due to continued settlement expansion or other factors, the only alternative is a de facto one-state reality. This could either lead to a loss of Israel's Jewish character (if Palestinians are granted full rights) or an apartheid-like system (if they are not), both of which are seen as detrimental to Israel's future.
6. Potential for Regional Peace and Prosperity: A resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often seen as a key to unlocking broader regional peace and economic cooperation between Israel and other Arab nations, even those that have signed normalization agreements.

In conclusion, the debate over Israeli concessions is not about ignoring past Palestinian actions or denying Israel's legitimate security concerns. Instead, it's about whether those past actions and current fears should dictate the entire future of the region, or if a different approach, involving difficult compromises, might ultimately serve Israel's long-term interests (security, democracy, international standing) more effectively.

Palestian Refusal to Peace

Why have the "Arabs of the mandated Areas" "Palestinians" consistently refused to accept the territory they occupy as a finality and declare their state?

The reasons why "Arabs of the mandated Areas"  have consistently refused to accept various territorial proposals and declare a state on the territory they currently occupy are deeply rooted in their "false" historical narrative, national aspirations, and a series of perceived injustices. 

Here's a breakdown of the key factors:

1. Historical Grievances and the "Nakba" (Catastrophe):

"Loss of Land" in 1948:

"Arabs of the mandated Areas" view the 1948 war (which they call the Nakba) as a catastrophic event that led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arab residents and the loss of much of "their" ancestral land. 

They contend that the establishment of Israel came at their expense and that the UN Partition Plan, which allocated a portion of land to a Jewish state despite Arabs being the majority population and "owning" most of the land, was inherently unjust.

Refugee Issue: The "right of return" for those Arab refugees "displaced" in 1948 and subsequent conflicts is a central and non-negotiable demand for most Palestinians.

Accepting a state solely on the "West Bank" and Gaza without addressing the refugee issue would be seen as abandoning a core component of their national identity and rights.

2. The Scope of Proposed Territories and Borders:

1967 Borders: Palestinians insist on a state based on the 1967 borders (pre-Six-Day War "cease-fire" lines), with East Jerusalem as its capital. This is the internationally recognized basis for a two-state solution.

Israeli "Settlements": The continuous expansion of Israeli settlements in the "West Bank" and East Jerusalem since 1967 is a major obstacle to the "Palestinians", who view these settlements as illegal under international law and as actively eroding the contiguity and viability of a future Palestinian state. They argue that accepting a state with the current settlement blocs would mean accepting a significantly diminished and fragmented territory.

Land Swaps: While land swaps are often part of peace proposals, Palestinians have often found the proposed swaps to be insufficient in quality or quantity to compensate for the land taken by settlements, or that they further compromise the contiguity of their state.

Jerusalem: The status of Jerusalem is a highly emotional and religious issue for both sides. Palestinians demand East Jerusalem as the capital of their state, given its historical and religious significance. Israeli claims over all of Jerusalem are seen as a direct violation of Palestinian rights and aspirations.

3. Sovereignty and Viability of a Future State:

Lack of Full Sovereignty: 

Peace proposals, particularly those offered by Israel, have often included limitations on the sovereignty of a future Palestinian state, especially regarding security, airspace, and borders. Palestinians argue that these limitations would render their state a "Bantustan" or a non-viable entity, not a truly independent nation.

Economic Viability: 

The fragmentation of the West Bank due to settlements, checkpoints, and restrictions on movement, along with the isolation of Gaza, raises serious concerns about the economic viability of a future Palestinian state.

Security Concerns: While Israel insists on security arrangements, Palestinians often view these as disproportionate and infringing on their sovereignty.

4. Leadership and Internal Divisions:

Lack of a United Front: 

Palestinian leadership has historically been fragmented, with different factions holding varying degrees of willingness to compromise. The division between Fatah (governing the West Bank) and Hamas (governing Gaza) further complicates any unified approach to peace negotiations.

Fear of Being Perceived as "Sell-Outs": Palestinian leaders face immense pressure from their population and other factions not to concede on core demands. 

Accepting a deal perceived as less than optimal could lead to accusations of betrayal and destabilize their leadership.

Lack of Trust:

Decades of conflict, failed agreements, and continued occupation have fostered deep mistrust between the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships, making it difficult to reach and implement comprehensive agreements.

5. International Law and Principles:

Right to Self-Determination: 

Palestinians consistently emphasize their internationally recognized right to self-determination in the entire territory occupied in 1967. They believe that accepting less would be a betrayal of this fundamental right.

Illegality of Occupation and Settlements: The international community largely views the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem as illegal and the settlements as a violation of international law. Palestinians use this legal framework to justify their demands and reject proposals that do not fully address these issues.

In essence, for many Palestinians, accepting a state on fragmented territory with limited sovereignty, without addressing the refugee issue, and without East Jerusalem as its capital, would be seen as legitimizing the consequences of their historical dispossession and sacrificing their core national aspirations for a truly independent and viable state.

What did the Treaty of Sèvres (San Remo conference) and the Treaty of Lausanne say about Judaea and Shomron (the West Bank)?

Neither the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) nor the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) directly addressed the status of the Judaea and Shomron as a distinct entity. This is because the term "West Bank" only emerged later, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, to refer to Judaea and Shomron as the territory west of the Jordan River that was occupied by Jordan.

Here's what those agreements did say in relation to the broader region: San Remo Conference (1920) and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920):

Dismantling the Ottoman Empire: The Treaty of Sèvres was a post-World War I pact that formally dismantled the Ottoman Empire.

Creation of Mandates: The San Remo Conference (which preceded and laid the groundwork for Sèvres) determined the allocation of Class "A" League of Nations mandates for the administration of former Ottoman territories.

British Mandate for Palestine: 

The significant outcome for the area now known as the "West Bank" was the British Mandate for Palestine. This mandate, approved at San Remo, incorporated the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which expressed support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

Boundaries of Palestine: 

The Mandate for Palestine encompassed the area that would later be divided into present-day Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as Transjordan (present-day Jordan). 

Importantly, Transjordan (east of the Jordan River) was later excluded from the provisions for a Jewish national home within the Mandate.

The Treaty of Sèvres, though signed, was ultimately rejected by Turkish nationalists and never fully ratified.

Treaty of Lausanne (1923): replaced the Treaty of Sèvres. 

It was the final treaty concluding World War I and was signed by Turkey (the successor to the Ottoman Empire) and the Allied powers that recognized the boundaries of the modern state of Turkey.

Renunciation of Former Arab Provinces: 

Crucially, Turkey renounced all claims to its former Arab provinces, including those that fell under the British Mandate for Palestine. This solidified the international recognition of the British Mandate over Palestine, which included the territory that would later become the West Bank.

In summary, while the terms "West Bank" did not exist at the time, the San Remo Conference and the Treaty of Sèvres (though superseded) established the framework for the British Mandate for Palestine, which included the geographical area that would eventually become the West Bank. 

The Treaty of Lausanne confirmed Turkey's renunciation of claims to these territories, thereby reinforcing the international legitimacy of the Mandate. 

The current status of the West Bank is a result of later events, including the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1949 Armistice Agreements, Jordan's annexation of the territory, and the 1967 Six-Day War and subsequent Israeli Liberation from Jordanian occupation.

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The notion of the West Bank as "Terra Nullius" (land belonging to no one)

The notion of the West Bank as "Terra Nullius" (land belonging to no one) in international law is not the prevailing view and is largely rejected by the followers and brainwashed minions of the "False Narrative" of the "international community".

Here's why, and the arguments often made by those who do propose it:

"Terra Nullius" is generally rejected for the West Bank because it is "inhabited Territory". 

The fundamental principle of terra nullius applies to land that is truly uninhabited or inhabited by communities not considered to have a recognized political organization. 

The West Bank has always been inhabited by a substantial Arab   population with a "clear social and political structure". 

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1975 advisory opinion on Western Sahara clarified that "territories inhabited by tribes or peoples with a social and political organization were not regarded as terra nullius."

Prior Sovereignty/Mandate:

The British Mandate for Palestine (established by the San Remo Resolution and Treaty of Lausanne) included the geographical area of the West Bank. This mandate recognized a pre-existing population and aimed towards self-determination, not the treatment of the land as empty. 

While the mandate itself didn't confer full sovereignty on the Arab residents, it certainly didn't declare the territory terra nullius.

Jordanian Annexation (though unrecognized): 

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jordan occupied and annexed the West Bank. 

While this annexation was largely unrecognized by the international community (with the notable exceptions of the UK and Iraq), it demonstrated a claim of sovereignty and control, further contradicting the idea of terra nullius. 

The fact that an entity exercised control, even if its sovereignty wasn't universally accepted, prevents the designation of terra nullius.

Right to Self-Determination: 

Modern international law places strong emphasis on the right to self-determination of peoples. To declare the West Bank terra nullius would deny the Arab residents their right to self-determination over their ancestral lands, which is a core principle.

Belligerent Occupation: 

The prevailing international legal view, as affirmed by numerous UN resolutions, the ICJ, and most states, is that the "West Bank" (including East Jerusalem) is "occupied territory" under international humanitarian law (specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention). 

The laws of belligerent occupation apply, meaning Israel, as the occupying power, does not have sovereignty over the territory and is bound by specific obligations regarding its administration and the protection of the civilian population. 

 

Google Gemini and the "False Narrative"

For the sake of "argument" I asked Google Gemini for the true facts:

IF the so called "West Bank" was conqured and annexed by Jordan, who exercised control from 1948 to 1967. And with the "Palestinians" refusing the Partition and to establish a "State" from 1948-1967.

Would not Israel's response to Jordanian aggression of the area not be a "Liberation" of the Mandated Area designated by the Treaty of Sèvres (San Remo conference) and the Treaty of Lausanne as the future homeland of the Jewsish People?

This is a complex question that touches upon highly contentious legal and historical interpretations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Let's break down the different legal and historical arguments involved in your question:

1. The Legal Status of the West Bank Post-1948

Jordanian Annexation:

As you correctly state, Jordan occupied the West Bank after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and formally annexed it in 1950. This annexation was largely unrecognized by the international community, with the notable exceptions of the United Kingdom and Pakistan. The prevailing international view was that Jordan's occupation and annexation did not confer legitimate sovereignty.

The "Palestinian" Refusal and Statehood (1948-1967):

It's true that the Arab states, including the Palestinian leadership at the time, rejected the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181) which proposed the creation of separate Arab and Jewish states.

Consequently, no Palestinian state was established in the areas allocated to it by the UN during this period.

Implication for Sovereignty:

Because Jordan's annexation was largely unrecognized, and no Palestinian state emerged, some arguments contend that the West Bank lacked a clear, internationally recognized sovereign between 1948 and 1967. This "legal vacuum" argument is central to claims that the territory was not under legitimate sovereignty when Israel gained control in 1967.

2. Israel's Actions in 1967 and the Concept of "Liberation"
Self-Defense:
Israel's actions in 1967 are primarily framed by Israel as a defensive war against a coalition of Arab states that were perceived to be preparing for an attack.

From this perspective, gaining control of the West Bank was a result of a legitimate act of self-defense.

"Liberation" of a Mandated Area for a Jewish Homeland:

This is where your argument directly connects to the San Remo Resolution and the Treaty of Sèvres/Lausanne.

The San Remo Resolution (1920) formally incorporated the Balfour Declaration into the framework for the British Mandate for Palestine. The Balfour Declaration supported "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) confirmed Turkey's relinquishment of claims to these territories, solidifying the international recognition of the Mandate.

The Argument:

Proponents of this view argue that since the Mandate (rooted in San Remo/Lausanne) envisioned a Jewish homeland within Palestine, and since Jordan's annexation was illegitimate, Israel's capture of the West Bank in 1967 effectively "liberated" this territory, returning it to its intended purpose as part of the Jewish national home, as mandated by the international community post-Ottoman Empire.

From this perspective, it was not an "occupation" of sovereign territory but rather the assertion of a prior, internationally recognized right.

Support for this View:

This perspective is strongly held by many in Israel, particularly within the political right, and is often articulated by legal scholars who emphasize the historical and legal claims arising from the Mandate. They may refer to the area as "Judea and Samaria" rather than the "West Bank."

3. Counterarguments and the Dominant International Legal View the "West Bank"as Occupied Territory:

The dominant international legal view; hereby known by the believers and followers of the "False Narrative" held by the vast majority of UN member states, the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and international legal bodies. is that the West Bank is "occupied Palestinian territory" under international humanitarian law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Basis:

This view holds that regardless of the legitimacy of Jordan's annexation, the territory was under the control of a sovereign entity (even if unrecognized by some) and inhabited by a distinct population.
According to the believers and followers of the "False Narrative", when Israel took control in 1967, it became the "belligerent occupier."

Implications of Occupation:

As an occupying power, Israel does not gain sovereignty over the territory. It is bound by obligations to protect the civilian population, refrain from changing the demographic structure, and not to exploit resources for its own benefit.

Self-Determination of the Palestinian People:

Modern international law strongly emphasizes the right to self-determination. Even if the Palestinian leadership did not establish a state between 1948 and 1967, the Palestinian people are recognized as having a right to self-determination, which includes the right to establish their own state in the territory.

This right is seen as superseding older mandates or claims of terra nullius.

UN Resolution 242 (1967):
This pivotal resolution, passed after the Six-Day War, called for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict."
While the exact wording ("territories" versus "the territories") is debated, the international consensus is that it implied withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, which includes the West Bank.

Conclusion:
Your question highlights a fundamental clash of legal interpretations:

One side emphasizes the historical context of the Mandate, the lack of recognized Jordanian sovereignty, and Israel's right to defend itself, leading to the view that the West Bank's capture in 1967 was a "liberation" consistent with the vision of a Jewish homeland.

The other side (held by the believers and followers of the "False Narrative" -the dominant international view)-
Emphasizes the principles of international humanitarian law, the right to self-determination, and the illegitimacy of acquiring territory by force, viewing the West Bank as occupied territory pending a final peace agreement.

There is no single, universally accepted answer to whether Israel's actions constituted a "liberation" in the sense you describe under international law.

The perspective you presented is a significant legal and historical argument used by Israel and its supporters, but it directly conflicts with the "view" held by the believers and followers of the "False Narrative" who have a "international legal consensus" on the status of the West Bank.