Israel and the evolution of special operations and unconventional warfare

Israel's evolution of special operations and unconventional warfare is deeply intertwined with its unique geopolitical circumstances, lack of strategic depth, and a persistent need to overcome numerical inferiority against hostile neighbors and non-state actors. This history has forged a military doctrine emphasizing preemption, offensive action, and high-quality, adaptable forces.

Here's a breakdown of the key influences and developments:

1. Early Zionist Paramilitary Groups (Pre-State Foundations)

Before the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Haganah (the primary Jewish paramilitary organization) and its elite strike force, the Palmach, laid the groundwork for future Israeli special operations.

Influence of Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads (SNS): During the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, British Captain (later Major General) Orde Wingate, a staunch Zionist, trained and led mixed British-Jewish units called the Special Night Squads.

"Offensive Defense": Wingate introduced the revolutionary concept of taking the fight to the enemy at night, rather than passively defending settlements. This emphasized proactive, offensive operations, ambushes, and night infiltration.

Small Unit Tactics: The SNS operated in small, agile groups, relying on surprise and decisive action.

Leadership by Example: Wingate's personal, highly aggressive leadership style inspired his men and a generation of future Israeli military leaders (e.g., Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon, Yitzhak Rabin).

Controversial Ethics: Wingate's methods, including some alleged retaliatory actions against Arab civilians, were highly effective but also controversial, showcasing a willingness to bend rules for perceived military necessity, a trait that would, at times, resurface in early Israeli special ops.

Palmach's Adaptation: The Palmach wholeheartedly embraced Wingate's principles, refining night operations, small-unit tactics, and aggressive leadership. They focused on:

• Raids and Ambushes: Disrupting Arab and British forces.
• Clandestine Operations: Operating as an underground force, developing skills in covert movement and intelligence.
• Developing Commanders: Nurturing a cadre of highly independent and effective field commanders, many of whom would lead the IDF.
• "Fighting as Guerrillas": Against a more powerful conventional foe, they adopted irregular methods out of necessity.

2. The Early IDF (1948-1950s): Retaliation and Deterrence

After 1948, Israel faced constant cross-border infiltrations and attacks from fedayeen (Palestinian irregulars) originating from neighboring Arab states. This necessitated a new approach to deterrence and response.

• Unit 30 and Unit 101:
• Unit 30 (1951): An early attempt at a specialized retaliation unit, but it was not deemed successful enough.
• Unit 101 (1953): Formed by Ariel Sharon on direct orders from David Ben-Gurion, Unit 101 was a groundbreaking development.

Purpose: To conduct daring, rapid reprisal raids across borders to deter future attacks and restore a sense of security.

Tactics: Pioneered small-unit maneuvers, activation, and insertion/exit tactics. They were highly aggressive, often operating at night.

Controversy: The unit gained notoriety for its effectiveness but also for controversial actions like the Qibya raid in 1953, which resulted in significant civilian casualties. This highlighted the tension between military necessity and international condemnation.

Integration: Unit 101 was short-lived as an independent entity, but its spirit and many of its personnel (including Sharon) were quickly merged into the Paratroopers Brigade, spreading its aggressive ethos and special operations methods throughout a larger, more conventional force.

3. Maturation and Specialization (1960s-1970s): Sayeret Matkal and Counter-Terrorism

The success of Unit 101 and the lessons from early conflicts led to the further professionalization and specialization of Israeli special operations.

Sayeret Matkal (General Staff Reconnaissance Unit, 1957): Modeled after the British SAS (even adopting their motto "Who Dares Wins"), Sayeret Matkal became the IDF's premier special operations unit.

1. Primary Role: Deep reconnaissance and intelligence gathering behind enemy lines.
2. Secondary Role: Hostage rescue and counter-terrorism (CT).

Methodology: Emphasizes meticulous planning, advanced intelligence, highly selective recruitment, and rigorous training. Operations are often covert and highly sensitive.

Iconic Operations: Famous for daring long-range raids and hostage rescues, such as Operation Isotope (Sabena Flight 571, 1972) and especially Operation Entebbe (1976), which became a textbook example of a successful long-range CT operation. This cemented Israel's reputation as a world leader in CT.

Shayetet 13 (Naval Commando Unit): The Israeli Navy's special forces, specializing in maritime special operations, including sabotage, reconnaissance, and counter-terrorism. Also known for its rigorous training and daring operations.

Rise of Counter-Terrorism: The 1970s saw a surge in international terrorism, often targeting Israeli interests. This necessitated a strong focus on counter-terrorism capabilities, with units like Sayeret Matkal and eventually the civilian Yamam (National Counter Terror Unit) becoming highly adept at hostage rescue and direct action against terrorist groups.

4. Adapting to Asymmetric Warfare and Evolving Threats (1980s-Present)

As the nature of conflict shifted from conventional state-on-state wars to more asymmetric conflicts with non-state actors (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas), Israeli special operations continued to evolve.

Focus on Asymmetric Warfare: 

Israeli special forces are heavily involved in fighting insurgencies, conducting targeted killings, intelligence gathering in urban environments, and dealing with tunnel warfare.

"Mista'arvim" Units:" Units like Duvdevan and Shimshon (later absorbed) specialize in undercover operations, blending in with the Arab population to conduct intelligence, arrests, and counter-terrorism. This is a unique and highly sensitive form of unconventional warfare.

Technological Integration: Extensive use of advanced technology for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), precision targeting, and communication.

Special Operations Command ("Depth Corps"): In 2011, Israel established a "Depth Corps" (now often referred to as a Special Operations Command) to better coordinate its numerous special forces units across different branches, aiming for greater synergy in long-range and complex operations, reflecting a global trend in SOF organization.

Hybrid Warfare: More recently, Israel has engaged in what is termed "hybrid warfare," combining conventional military force with unconventional tactics, cyber operations, and psychological warfare, particularly in conflicts like the ongoing one in Gaza. This includes efforts to arm and support local forces to achieve specific objectives.

Conclusion

Israel's journey in special operations and unconventional warfare has been shaped by necessity. 

From the foundational influence of Wingate's offensive mindset and the Palmach's adaptable small-unit tactics, through the aggressive retaliation of Unit 101, to the sophisticated intelligence and CT capabilities of Sayeret Matkal and the specialized "Mista'arvim" units, the IDF has continually refined its approach.

The key drivers remain:

• Lack of Strategic Depth: Requiring offensive action and deterrence.
• Numerical Inferiority: Demanding qualitative superiority through elite forces, advanced training, and innovative tactics.
• Dynamic Threat Environment: Adapting to evolving challenges from state armies, irregular forces, and global terrorism.

While retaining a strong emphasis on direct action and rapid response, Israel's special operations have also become increasingly nuanced, integrating sophisticated intelligence, technological prowess, and a willingness to engage in complex, multi-layered "hybrid" approaches to maintain its security edge in a volatile region.

Comparing methods of special operations and unconventional warfare

Comparing the methods of Otto Skorzeny, the British SAS, Orde Wingate, and the Palmach's Special Night Squads (SNS) offers a fascinating look at the evolution of special operations and unconventional warfare, highlighting both shared principles and distinct ideological and institutional differences.

Otto Skorzeny's "Doctrine" (Personalized, Audacious, and Ethically Flexible) Key Characteristics:

• Audacious Direct Action: Focus on highly visible, often single-shot, high-risk missions (e.g., Mussolini rescue, Operation Greif).
• Deception & Perfidy: Willingness to use ruses of war, including wearing enemy uniforms to sow confusion and gain tactical advantage, even if this bordered on or crossed into perfidy (illegal under international law if used during an attack to feign protected status).
• Psychological Impact: Operations aimed to demoralize the enemy and inspire his own forces.
• Improvisation & Opportunism: High adaptability and seizing opportunities as they arose.
• Centralized, Personal Control: Missions often flowed from Hitler's direct command to Skorzeny, who executed them with significant personal authority.
• Ethical Stance: Highly pragmatic and unconstrained by conventional military ethics or international law when it came to achieving objectives.

British SAS Doctrine (Professionalized, Discreet, and Legally Compliant)

Key Characteristics:

• Strategic Reconnaissance & Direct Action: Core roles involve operating deep behind enemy lines for intelligence gathering and precision strikes.
• Small, Independent Teams: Emphasis on highly trained, self-reliant small teams capable of sustained operations.
• Surprise, Speed, Violence of Action: Standard direct-action principles.
• Meticulous Planning & Rehearsal: Detailed preparation is crucial for mission success.
• Covert/Discreet Operations: Often prioritize stealth and avoiding detection, especially for reconnaissance.
• Strict Adherence to Laws of Armed Conflict: Operates within legal and ethical boundaries, differentiating between legitimate ruses of war and perfidy.
• Institutionalized Training & Doctrine: A professional force with standardized selection, training, and evolving doctrines.
• Long-Term Strategic Impact: Missions are typically part of broader strategic objectives (e.g., supporting resistance movements, counterterrorism).

British Captain (later Major General) Orde Wingate, a staunch Zionist, trained and led mixed British-Jewish units called the Special Night Squads (SNS) (Offensive Irregularity & Leadership by Example)

Wingate's influence on the Special Night Squads occurred during the 1936-39 Arab Revolt when the unit was formed to fight Counterinsurgency against Arab rebels in Mandatory British Controlled Palestine.

Context:

Key Characteristics:

• Offensive, Night Operations: Pioneering the concept of taking the fight to the enemy at night, rather than passively defending. This was revolutionary for the British Army at the time.
• Mixed British-Jewish Units: Collaborative effort with the Haganah (Jewish paramilitary organization), providing invaluable training to future Israeli military leaders (e.g., Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon).
• Ambush & Interdiction: Focusing on Counterinsurgency by ambushing rebel groups and disrupting their movements.
• Aggressive Leadership: Wingate's personal, almost messianic, leadership style, leading from the front and pushing his men to their limits.
• “Fighting the guerrillas like guerrillas":  A pragmatic approach to counter-insurgency.
• Ethical Stance (Controversial): While the SNS was effective, Wingate's methods (including alleged collective punishment and "robust" intelligence gathering) were highly controversial and criticized for their brutality and impact on civilian populations. This aspect distinguishes him sharply from the SAS's formalized ethical code.

Palmach Night Squads (Indigenous, Pragmatic, and Foundation-Building)

The Palmach Hebrew Plugot HaMaḥatz (the elite strike force of the Haganah in Mandatory Palestine) adopted and adapted many of Wingate's principles, particularly in its early "Night Squads" and wider fighting methods.

Key Characteristics:

• Offensive Night Operations: Directly influenced by Wingate, the Palmach prioritized night attacks, ambushes, and raids.
• Small Unit Tactics (Minor Tactics Warfare): Operating in small, agile units (squads, platoons) due to limited manpower, weaponry, and the clandestine nature of their operations.
• Emphasis on Training & Leadership: Developed highly capable, independent field commanders (many trained by Wingate directly or indirectly) who led from the front.
• Adaptability & Initiative: Crucial for an underground force operating against a superior British and later Arab conventional force.
• Clandestine Operations: Operated secretly, often using subterfuge, against both the British Mandate and Arab forces.
• Political Objectives: Unlike purely military special forces, the Palmach's operations were deeply intertwined with the political goal of establishing a Jewish state.
• Foundation of a Future Army: The Palmach's methods and personnel formed the core of the nascent Israel Defense Forces.

In essence,

Skorzeny represented the radical, often ethically unconstrained, individual genius of special operations.

The SAS embodies the institutionalized, professional, and globally applicable model.

Wingate was a “visionary pioneer” who proved the efficacy of offensive irregular warfare, influencing both his own military and the nascent Israeli forces.

The Palmach Night Squads were the “pragmatic, indigenous adaptation” of these principles, crucial for survival and state-building in a challenging environment. 

All four, however, understood the critical role of surprise, speed, and highly trained personnel in achieving disproportionate results in unconventional warfare.

Comparing the Otto Skorzeny Waffen SS commando doctrine to that of the British SAS (Special Air Service)

Comparing the "Skorzeny doctrine" to that of the SAS (Special Air Service) reveals both striking similarities in the practical application of special operations and fundamental differences in their underlying philosophy, ethical considerations, and institutional integration.

The "Skorzeny Doctrine" (Unconventional Warfare as a Personal Art)

As established, this isn't a codified doctrine but rather a reflection of Otto Skorzeny's approach to special operations, characterized by:

• Audacity and Daring:  A willingness to conceive and execute highly risky, often unprecedented missions (e.g., Mussolini's rescue).
• Deception and Ruses of War: Extensive use of elaborate deceptions, including impersonating enemy forces and using enemy equipment, to achieve surprise and sow confusion (e.g., Operation Greif during the Battle of the Bulge). This often pushed, and sometimes crossed, the boundaries of international law.
• Psychological Warfare: Operations were designed not just for physical impact but also for profound psychological effect on the enemy and, crucially, to boost the morale of his own side.
• Focus on High-Value Targets/Strategic Impact: Missions aimed at individuals or specific objectives that would have disproportionate strategic or political consequences.
• Improvised and Adaptive: Skorzeny was known for his adaptability and ability to improvise solutions in the field, often operating with significant autonomy.
• Personal Leadership: His operations were heavily reliant on his personal charisma, cunning, and direct leadership.

The SAS Doctrine (Codified Special Operations)

The SAS (Special Air Service), founded by David Stirling during WWII, developed a more formalized doctrine rooted in specific principles that have evolved over decades. Key tenets include:

• Selection and Training: A rigorous, highly selective process designed to identify individuals with extreme physical and mental resilience, adaptability, and self-reliance.
• Small Teams and Independence: Operations are often conducted by small, highly trained teams capable of operating independently for extended periods behind enemy lines.
• Surprise, Speed, and Violence of Action: These are core principles for direct action missions, overwhelming the enemy at the point of attack.
• Detailed Planning and Rehearsal: Meticulous planning, intelligence gathering, and realistic rehearsals are paramount to minimizing friction and ensure success. (This is a key element of McRaven's influential theory of special operations, which echoes early SAS principles).
• Adaptability and Initiative (Mission Command): While highly trained and briefed, SAS operators are empowered to use their initiative to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground, within the commander's intent.
• Discreet and Covert Operations: A strong emphasis on stealth and avoiding detection, especially in special reconnaissance and covert action roles.
• Intelligence Gathering: Integral to all operations, from planning to execution, for target acquisition and situational awareness.
• Unconventional Warfare (UW): Long-term engagement with indigenous forces, training, advising, and assisting them in resistance or insurgency against a common enemy. This is a core SAS capability, particularly historically.
• Counter-Terrorism (CT): A specialized and highly prominent role since the 1970s, demanding precision, speed, and often overt force.

Comparison: Similarities and Differences

Similarities:

1. Audacity and Risk-Taking: Both approaches embrace daring operations that deviate from conventional military tactics.
2. Focus on Relative Superiority: Both seek to achieve a decisive advantage over a numerically superior or well-defended enemy through tactics like surprise, speed, and specialized skills. As McRaven outlines, this involves simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose – all elements found in successful Skorzeny operations and foundational to SAS methods.
3. High-Impact Operations: Both aim for missions that yield significant strategic, political, or psychological outcomes disproportionate to the size of the force employed.
4. Elite Personnel: Both require highly capable, adaptable, and determined individuals who can operate under extreme pressure.
5. Unconventional Methods: Both operate outside the strictures of conventional warfare, leveraging ingenuity and unorthodox tactics.

 Differences:

1.Ethical and Legal Boundaries

Skorzeny: Famously (and controversially) blurred lines regarding the laws of armed conflict, particularly with the use of enemy uniforms in combat (Operation Greif), which is considered perfidy under the Geneva Conventions if used to feign protected status during an attack. His methods were often expedient and disregarded established international norms.

SAS: Operates strictly within the framework of international law and the laws of armed conflict. While highly secretive and often covert, the SAS adheres to rules of engagement and maintains accountability to its government. Deception is used, but typically within the bounds of "ruses of war" (e.g., feints, camouflage, disinformation) rather than perfidy.

2 Institutionalization and Doctrine:

Skorzeny: His "doctrine" was largely personal, uncodified, and tied to his unique command within the SS. It was less about a reproducible, institutional approach and more about his personal genius (or notoriety).

SAS: Has a deeply ingrained, codified doctrine built on rigorous selection, standardized training, and established procedures. It's a professional military unit with a clear hierarchy and accountability. Its methods are taught, refined, and disseminated throughout the organization.

2. Mission Scope and Evolution:

Skorzeny: Primarily focused on direct action, special reconnaissance, and politically sensitive missions within the context of a declining Nazi regime.

SAS: Evolved from desert raiding and partisan support in WWII to encompass a broader spectrum of roles, including counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, hostage rescue, and intelligence gathering, adapting to modern threats.

3. Long-Term Strategy vs. Immediate Impact:

Skorzeny: Often sought immediate, decisive impacts, sometimes without a clear long-term strategic follow-up, especially as the war turned against Germany.

SAS: While executing immediate tactical missions, these are typically integrated into broader strategic objectives, particularly in roles like counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense which require sustained engagement.

In essence, while Skorzeny demonstrated the “potential” of special operations through his audacious exploits, the SAS represents the “professionalization” and “institutionalization” of special operations, embedding similar tactical principles within a framework of rigorous training, ethical conduct (within military norms), and long-term strategic relevance.

The SAS, and indeed many modern special forces units, have likely studied Skorzeny's successes and failures, but they have built their capabilities on a foundation of discipline, accountability, and adherence to the laws of war, which Skorzeny often disregarded.

The "Skorzeny doctrine" and Yasser Arafat

As I was checking comments and posts on Facebook this AM I noticed where a Friend had posted. 

"Arafat was a follower of Otto Skorzeny of the Nazi era. He invented the use of the PLO style of terror. Skorzeny’s legacy is with us in the PLO and all the other Jihadists groups."

Background information: Who was Otto Skorzeny? 

Otto Johann Anton Skorzeny (12 June 1908 – 5 July 1975) was an Austrian-born German SS-Standartenführer in the Waffen-SS during World War II. 

During the war, he was involved in several operations, including the removal from power of Hungarian Regent Miklós Horthy and the Gran Sasso raid that rescued Benito Mussolini from captivity.

Skorzeny led Operation Greif, during the 1944 "Battle of the Bulge" in which German soldiers infiltrated Allied lines wearing their enemies' uniforms. 

As a result, he was charged in 1947 at the Dachau Military Tribunal with breaching the 1907 Hague Convention but was acquitted. Skorzeny escaped from an internment camp in 1948, hiding out on a Bavarian farm as well as in Salzburg and Paris. 

In 1953, he served as a military advisor to the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. He was allegedly an advisor to Argentinian president Juan Perón.

In 1963 Skorzeny and other former Nazis were deceptively recruited by the Mossad to obtain information during "Operation Diamond" on German scientists who were working on an Egyptian project to develop rockets to be used against Israel.

When Skorzeny discovered the truth that those who had recruited him, and other "ex-Nazis" were, in actuality, members of the Israeli Mossad, he offered to help, and NOT disclose the truth to the other ex-Nazis, only if Wiesenthal removed him from his list of wanted war criminals and that the Mossad help him relocate to Spain and provide him "subsistence". 

Wiesenthal refused to "remove him from the list. But, according to senior Mossad agent Rafi Meidan, Skorzeny accepted the relocation and “subsistence” offer from Isser Harel and finally agreed to help anyway. 

Skorzeny died of lung cancer on 5 July 1975 in Madrid at the age of 67. 

The "Skorzeny doctrine"

The "Skorzeny doctrine" isn't a formally recognized military doctrine in the same way as, say, Blitzkrieg or Sun Tzu's principles. Instead, it refers to the utilization of unconventional warfare tactics, principles, and the personal philosophy associated with Otto Skorzeny, a highly controversial but effective SS commando during World War II.

Skorzeny became famous for several daring special operations, most notably the rescue of Benito Mussolini in 1943 (Operation Oak) and his involvement in Operation Greif during the Battle of the Bulge, where German soldiers infiltrated Allied lines wearing enemy uniforms to sow confusion and disruption.

While not a formal doctrine, the "Skorzeny doctrine" can be understood to embody the following characteristics:

• Emphasis on audacious special operations: - Skorzeny believed in highly specialized, often small-scale missions aimed at achieving strategic objectives through surprise, deception, and psychological impact. These operations often defied conventional military wisdom.
• Deception and irregular warfare: - A key element was the use of ruses of war, including wearing enemy uniforms, speaking their language, and using their equipment, to infiltrate and disorient the enemy. This often pushed the boundaries of international law regarding combatant status.
• Focus on high-value targets: -His missions often targeted critical individuals (like Mussolini or Hungarian Regent Miklós Horthy) or infrastructure to achieve significant political or military outcomes.
• Speed, surprise, and decisive action: Skorzeny’s operations were characterized by meticulous planning, rapid execution, and a willingness to take extreme risks to achieve their objectives before the enemy could react.
• "Relative superiority": Some analyses of special operations, influenced by figures like Skorzeny, suggest that success is achieved by creating a "relative superiority" through a simple, concealed, rehearsed plan executed with surprise, speed, and purpose, even when numerically inferior to the enemy.

Historical Context and Controversy:

It's crucial to understand that Skorzeny's methods, particularly the use of enemy uniforms in combat (as seen in Operation Greif), were highly controversial and led to his post-war trial for war crimes. While he was acquitted, the legality and ethics of such tactics remain debated under international law (specifically the Hague Conventions).

Despite the controversy, Skorzeny's exploits had a significant impact on the development of special operations forces globally, and his legacy continues to be studied in the context of unconventional warfare and intelligence operations.

Arafat and the "Skorzeny doctrine"

While Yasser Arafat's tactics and the "Skorzeny doctrine" both fall under the umbrella of unconventional or irregular warfare, it's not accurate to say Arafat "followed" Skorzeny's specific doctrine in a direct, doctrinaire sense. However, there are significant parallels in the types of tactics and principles they employed:

Similarities:

Emphasis on audacious, unconventional operations: Both Skorzeny and Arafat's organizations (like Fatah and its subgroups) engaged in highly visible, often shocking acts designed to achieve strategic impact and attract international attention. Skorzeny's rescue of Mussolini and Arafat's use of tactics like hijackings and the Munich Olympics attack serve as examples.

Deception and irregular warfare: Skorzeny was infamous for using enemy uniforms to sow confusion (Operation Greif). Arafat's groups also engaged in clandestine terrorist operations and by deception, used civilian clothing.

Arafat created a supposed PLO / Fatah subgroup, “The Black September Organization”, for clandestine terrorist attacks that the PLO / Fatah didn't want to be openly associated with, indicating a form of deceptive operation.

Focus on high-value targets (broadly defined): Skorzeny targeted individuals (Mussolini, Horthy, Tito) and critical infrastructure. Arafat's PLO / Fatah terrorist groups also often targeted Israeli civilians and symbols of the state to pressure for political objectives.

Psychological impact: Both Arafat and Skorzeny understood the power of their actions to create fear, disruption, and draw attention to their respective causes. Skorzeny's operations were designed to create confusion and demoralize the enemy. Arafat aimed to disrupt Israeli society and put the Palestinian cause on the global agenda through shocking acts of violence.

Operating from a position of "inferiority": Both Arafat's PLO / Fatah terrorists and Skorzeny’s units operated as smaller, less conventional forces against larger, established military powers, aiming to achieve "relative superiority" through surprise, speed, and specific tactics rather than overwhelming force.

Differences/Nuances:

Formal doctrine vs. pragmatic adaptation: Skorzeny's "doctrine" was more a collection of his personal approaches and principles, whereas Arafat's strategies evolved over time, shifting between armed struggle and diplomacy ("phased strategy"). While Arafat embraced armed struggle, he also engaged in political maneuvering and sought international recognition.

Goals: Skorzeny's operations were primarily military strategic within the context of a conventional war. Arafat's overarching goal was political: the establishment of a Palestinian state, often using armed struggle as a means to that political end.

Legal/Ethical Framework: Skorzeny's methods, particularly the use of enemy uniforms in combat, raised significant questions of international law. Arafat's embrace of certain forms of "terrorism" (as defined by many nations and organizations) also sparked widespread condemnation and controversy regarding their legality and ethics.

In summary, while Yasser Arafat did not explicitly "follow" the Skorzeny doctrine, his approach to armed struggle and unconventional warfare shared many common tactical and philosophical underpinnings with the methods associated with Skorzeny, particularly in their shared emphasis on daring, deceptive, and high-impact operations by smaller forces to achieve strategic aims.

 

Watermelon and Strawberries Lies

Face-Palm! 

Druze are being slaughtered in Syria and the trolls, those mentally challenged followers of the "Landless refugee decendants of the eunuchs of the Great Nachba" who suffer from profound Histrionic personality disorder (HPD) are filling "Social Media" with the claim that; "Gaza was a top exporter of strawberries and watermelons" 

And on top of this ludicrous fabrication they make the nefarious claim; That "Israel took everything from us." This ludicris claim is yet another distortion of historical truth lacking historical evidence!

Regarding strawberries:

The DOCUMENT TRUTH is that strawberry cultivation for export in Gaza may have been present earlier. However strawberry cultivation for export was particularly encouraged by Israeli authorities after 1967 following the Israeli liberation of former Mandated Area in the Six-Day War and the improvement in the water infrastructure and advent of "drip irrigation".

FACT: Historical sources indicate that countries like Egypt began cultivating strawberries during the reign of Mohamed Ali, which would be in the early to mid-19th century. These early efforts would have involved introducing the hybrid varieties that had been developed in Europe in the 18th century.

Todays modern strawberry is the result of a cross between two different species:

• Fragaria virginiana (Virginia strawberry): Native to eastern North America. This species brought good flavor and fruitfulness to the mix.
• Fragaria chiloensis (Chilean strawberry): Brought from Chile to France by a French spy named Amédée-François Frézier in 1714. This species contributed the desired large size to the new hybrid.

So, while various wild strawberry species have been found in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres for centuries (including in Europe, North America, and South America), the large, juicy, and sweet strawberry that dominates commercial production today is a relatively modern creation, a product of intentional breeding in 18th-century Europe using parent plants from the Americas.

It is true that prior to 1967, citrus fruits were the dominant crop in northern Gaza. 

Citrus tree growth prior to Israel's liberation of the Gaza strip, was dependent on an inadequate water supplies drawn from wells and cisterns dependent on seasonal rainfall channeled by a traditional method, known as furrow irrigation, which involves creating channels (furrows) between crop rows to guide water flow to the citrus trees. 

This above ground supply of water method was susceptible to evaporation in the dry heat made citrus cultivation more expensive for Gazan farmers due to the massive and improper water use pulled from underground sources to irrigate the citrus groves.

It should be noted that Citrus fruits are not native to the Middle East, but originated in the Himalayan foothills. 

The citron which is referred to in Hebrew etrog (אֶתְרוֹג), was introduced to the area of the Fertile Crescent around the 2nd century BCE.  

The Etrog was brought "back" around 538 BCE and cultivated in Eretz Yisrael by Jews who returned from Babylonian captivity due to it's spiritual significance as one of the Four Species (Arba'ah Minim) used during the week-long holiday of Sukkot (Feast of Tabernacles). 

Even today some Jews eat the etrog or make jam from it, believing it to be a segula (efficacious remedy) for an easy childbirth. It is also sometimes saved and candied for Tu BiShvat (the New Year for Trees).

Regarding Oranges: 

It was Arab conquerors who introduced the sour orange (from Asia) to the Mediterranean region 650CE.

But it was Portuguese traders who brought the sweet orange to the Mediterranean, and it was this form that became the Jaffa (Shamouti) orange that quickly gained popularity and became the basis for the region's prominent citrus industry. 

Regarding Watermelons:

Archaeological evidence, including seeds and paintings in Egyptian tombs, shows their cultivation in Egypt dating back over 4,000 to 5,000 years. From their origins in Africa, watermelons spread to the Middle East, including the Land of Israel, about 3,000 years ago. 

Wait, wasn't that when the Jews returned to Eretz Yirael from slavery in Egypt?  Could it be the same story as with the etrog?

Yes it is, because watermelons are even mentioned in the Old Testament (Numbers 11:5), where the Israelites, after leaving Egypt, lament missing the foods they had there, including watermelons. 

The Talmud also mentions watermelons multiple times, indicating their common consumption as a sweet fruit in ancient Israel

Revised Agriculture:

Once Israel gained control of the former Mandated Area, Israeli authorities constructed a new more modern water infrastructure and introduced Gaza farmers to the Israeli invention of "drip irrigation" which gave them the potential to shift to growing strawberries and flowers, which were higher-value crops with good export potential.

So, while there isn't one single "person" credited with introducing strawberries to the Middle East, let alone "Gaza. The growth in Gaza was a strategic shift in agricultural policy, encouraged by Israeli authorities after 1967, that led to strawberries becoming a significant crop and export for Gaza. Which the lower class Gazan farmers adopted and excelled at in their "labor intense" cultivation, turning them into "red gold" for the region.

It should also be noted that after Israel's 2005 "Disengagement", greenhouses with modernized water infrastructure were left for Gaza farmers. But immediately upon the withdrawal of the last Israeli the "Innocent civilians" of Gaza swarmed in in a wild frenzy, looting and destroying everything.  

So ladies and gentlemen just like the "False Narrative" of the "Great Nachba" the recent linking of the watermelon as a symbol of "Palestinian identity" due to the colors matching the Palestinian flag, is yet another mendacious fairy tale lie...

Elysium

So how was your day dear....WARNING - As old guy this rambles on.....

Well woke up, Oh how delightful! Yet, another day "expleted deleted"!!

Sat up, allowed my old broken bruised and abused body to realize that we are still on this side of the "Marble Garden" or as Maximus Decimus Meridius tells his troop in the movie Gladiator, that if they find themselves alone, in a peaceful, sunlit place, they are in Elysium, and they are already dead. 

I closed my eyes my old mind wandered off ...Ah yes Elysium..When I first heard this line from Gladiator by Maximus, whereby he tells his troops the story he is telling them that ;"That they are already dead, and he is essentially telling them to embrace their fate and fight without fear, as their potential death is not the end." This is how I have lived my life....

As for the "Wife" - she lived in "Her room". Once she retired, as an RN in our local Kupat Cholim (Sick Fund) as "THE" "Well Child" and "Yeladim" ) Children doctor's nurse and our aged cherished Mr Li aka Marley the family pet -the wifes baby- was put to sleep a year ago. The wife "moved on" to live in the "big city" of the "Greater Tel Aviv Area" to be near our youngest daughter, the VP of HR and IDF Captain officer, in the reserves to care for our second and youngest precious and utterly adorable grandson Tom born January 29th,2023.

So to continue, After my thought of Elysium I shook my old head and struggled to my feet and undressed. 

Went to the "Throne Room" did the "SSS" routine -for those who never donned a uniform -more explicitly "Walked the Walk"- it means shit, shower and shave. But because I have a beard I of course didn't shave. But hey some credit ladies I did brush what teeth I have left.... 

Went back to my room. Put on my "house clothes" slowly went down the steps downstairs ( I am handicapped).

As a "Older adult" I went to the fridge took out my insulin and the milk, took my daily regiment of pills injected my insulin and made and had my morning cup of coffee.

Place the milk and syringes of insulin back in fridge and took out my half-filled bottle of frozen water filled it from the Tami4 water bar.

On my way through my empty downstairs to the stairwell once full of my Kinder, who as in life spread their wings and have "flown the coup". 

I stopped and unlocked and opened the downstairs door and was greeted by Rustina -the copper colored neighborhood  Kitty Kat who comes to visit. I opened the container of dry cat food I keep in my entrance way and fed her and the others who gather to greet me. I replaced their water patted Rustina -who purred her approval and reentered my empty house.

I climbed back up the 17 steps to the upper floor. Walked the five paces to the entrance of what once was my oldest #1 son now Doctor David's old room. which has been my "Man Cave" for several years. 

I then climbed the four steps to the portion where my bed and desk with the computer are and sat down. 

As I sat down and turned on the computer, I stopped for a moment. I ask all of you who read this to consider your children and your grandchildren as you live in the "other world". 

My grandson as all of my grandchildren as well as my children and myself have lived these past two years under the immediate and very REAL threat of immediate death by the proxies of Iran, the Hezbollah and Hamas. 

For almost 18 months THOUSANDS of Iranian made copies of Chinese rockets were fired INDISCRIMINATLY by Hezbollah and Hamas and in the past year over 800 ballistic missiles from Iran! 

I have attempted to relay my feelings several times in videos of our situation...

All but a handful of you, my "Friends" on Facebook, have shown support and empathy ...

Your silence of those who have not commented reinforces OUR feeling that just like during the Holocaust we Jews are left to fend for ourselves....

Six Million Holocaust Victims

For years it has been my assertion, based on the Nazi regimes use of the Deutsche Hollerith Maschinen Gesellschaft, or Dehomag, and the fact that the Einsatzgruppen Schutzstaffel (SS) did NOT keep an accurate record of those Jews that they murdered in the implementation of the so-called Final solution to the Jewish question (Die Endlsung der Judenfrage), that more than 6 million Jews were exterminated in the Holocaust.

So I asked Gemini AI to verify my claim.

You are correct that the Nazi regime utilized the Deutsche Hollerith Maschinen Gesellschaft (Dehomag), a subsidiary of IBM, for various administrative and logistical purposes, including census operations that helped identify Jews and track their populations. This technology played a role in the systematic nature of the Holocaust, enabling the Nazis to manage and categorize their victims.

You are also correct that the Einsatzgruppen, the SS mobile killing squads, did not keep meticulous records of every single Jew they murdered in the "Holocaust by bullets" in Eastern Europe. Their killings were often carried out quickly and aimed at extermination, with efforts made to destroy evidence, such as exhuming mass graves and burning bodies.

However, the assertion that "more than 6 million Jews were exterminated in the Holocaust" due to these factors requires careful consideration of historical evidence. While it is true that exact figures are impossible to obtain due to the Nazis' efforts to conceal their crimes, the widely accepted figure of **six million Jews murdered** in the Holocaust is a result of extensive and rigorous historical research based on a combination of:

Nazi documents: 

Despite attempts to destroy evidence, a vast amount of Nazi documentation survived, including train manifests, census data, operational reports, and speeches, which provide crucial information about deportations, ghetto populations, and killings.

Nearly every Nazi concentration camp had a "Hollerith Abteilung" (Hollerith Department) that used these machines and punch cards to track prisoners. These cards recorded details like prisoner numbers, transfers, skills for forced labor, and even causes of death (though these were often falsified for those murdered).

These cards were primarily for managing inmate populations for forced labor and logistical purposes, rather than a direct "tally" of those being gassed or executed. The mass exterminations, particularly in the gas chambers, were often carried out with an intent to destroy evidence, making detailed punch card records of those specific acts unlikely to survive in large quantities.

The Nazis destroyed many records as the war drew to a close, including punch cards, to conceal their crimes. However, some records did survive.

Arguably the world's most comprehensive archive on the victims and survivors of Nazi persecution the Arolsen Archives at the International Center on Nazi Persecution (formerly International Tracing Service - ITS) located in Bad Arolsen, holds approximately 30 million documents related to:

• Concentration camps
• Forced labor
• Displaced persons
• Information on 17.5 million people persecuted by the Nazis.

The Arolsen Archives has been digitizing its vast collection, making much of it accessible online

Allied and post-war investigations:

• Allied forces meticulously documented the atrocities upon liberation of the camps, and post-war trials, like Nuremberg, relied heavily on captured Nazi documents and perpetrator testimonies.
• Victim testimonies: Survivors' accounts provide invaluable firsthand evidence of the horrific events.
•  Demographic analysis: Historians have compared pre-war Jewish populations with post-war numbers to estimate the scale of losses in different regions.
•  Forensic evidence: While many mass graves were exhumed and bodies burned, forensic investigations have still contributed to understanding the scope of massacres.

While the Einsatzgruppen's lack of precise record-keeping for every individual murder does introduce a degree of imprecision, their own reports and other German documents provide significant estimates of the numbers of people they killed. For instance, historians estimate the Einsatzgruppen killed over 1.4 million people, most of whom were Jews.

The figure of six million is a meticulously researched and widely accepted historical consensus, established by scholars and institutions like the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and Yad Vashem. 

While it's possible the true number could be slightly higher or lower, the current figure is based on the best available evidence and is considered the most accurate representation of the catastrophe. Asserting "more than 6 million" without new, substantial evidence risks undermining the established historical understanding and is often associated with forms of Holocaust distortion.